Are we witnessing the opening salvos of World War 3?

For what seems like the umpteenth successive day, Europe woke up to the news of overnight air strikes causing deaths, injuries and damage in one of many volatile regions further to the east.

The latest attacks were launched by Pakistan on a border region of Iran, and were explained as reprisals for Iranian attacks on a border region of Pakistan two days before. The reported casualties in both attacks were in single figures, so – by any military, if not simple human, standards – relatively small.

It is hard, nonetheless, to escape the impression of a theatre of military conflict that is inexorably growing – to the east and the south, if not yet to the north and the west. And if you look backwards, rather than forwards, the Hamas massacres of Israelis on 7 October, and Israel’s all-out military response, can be seen as turning the tiny sliver of the Gaza Strip into the epicentre of a conflict that could embrace regions many hundreds of miles further afield.

It might be instructive that the alarm being expressed internationally has so far seemed to be in inverse proportion to the real dangers. So it was that the Hamas attacks of October were followed by dire warnings that this could be the spark that ignited a regional conflagration; that it was only a matter of time before Iran became directly involved – probably through its proxy, Hezbollah, in southern Lebanon – and that, before long, you could be standing on the threshold of the next world war.

Voices in the United States, including Donald Trump’s one-time national security adviser, John Bolton, suggested that here might be an opportunity for the US to intervene directly and neutralise the perceived threat from Iran once and for all.

Such a scenario presupposed, however, that Iran would become involved, directly or indirectly, which – to the evident surprise of many – it did not do. Its supreme leader, no less, stated for the record that Iran had no intention of entering the fray, while the hawks in the United States folded their wings, cognisant perhaps of the perils of contributing to a new foreign adventure at the start of a year that would close with a US presidential election.

Three months on, the conflict that began in and around Gaza has evolved in very different directions from those initially envisaged – and the dangers, far from being held up as sparks that could ignite a far wider war are so far, for the most part, being played down.

Hostilities have indeed extended into southern Lebanon, though not in the sense of more intensive Hezbollah assaults on northern Israel, but in the form of political assassinations – of the deputy head of Hamas and a senior Hezbollah commander. Responsibility for the second was admitted by Israel, but not for the first, and the response from both Hezbollah and Iran remained in the rhetorical realm.

Then came an intervention from what seemed like leftfield, with the Houthis, who have controlled much of Yemen for the best part of 10 years, launching missiles and drones at vessels traversing the Red Sea, one of the notorious global “pinch points” for maritime trade. The Houthis, who are armed largely by Iran, said they were acting in solidarity with the Palestinians and targeting only ships with a connection to Israel or its allies.

At which point, with Europe-bound commercial vessels generally choosing to take the much longer route via southern Africa, the US and the UK appointed themselves guardians of regional maritime security and launched missile attacks on Houthi positions in Yemen.

All the while, though, they insisted that their action had no connection whatever with the Gaza conflict, but was all about freedom of navigation and retaliation (for a Houthi attack on a British warship). They explicitly rejected Houthi charges that their attacks represented de facto support for Israel, often failing to mention that the Houthis’ stated condition for halting its attacks was agreement to a ceasefire in Gaza.

Even as the US and the UK were taking on the Houthis, Iran was turning its attention to enemies closer to home. For the past two weeks, it has been launching air attacks into adjacent territory on all sides – into Syria, Iraq and most recently Pakistan – drawing protests and responses from the countries concerned. Any wider significance, however, has been largely played down – not just by Iran, but by those who warned most loudly about Iran’s hostile intentions back in October.

In recent days, Iran’s attacks on its neighbours have been presented as symptomatic of little local difficulties – with Isis terrorists, with Iranian rebel groups based just across the border, and with drug gangs and the like. In short, this is Iran pursuing its own small-scale national interests, with no wider ramifications worth worrying about.

That was until the latest fracas with Pakistan, where hostilities are still limited to the border area, but potentially pit one nuclear-armed country against another with nuclear ambitions. This also has the effect of extending the zone of conflict beyond what would generally be regarded as the Middle East, into the Greater Middle East and South Asia, with the risk of spilling over into Afghanistan, where Western, Chinese and Russia interests all coincide.

There is still, it seems to me, the possibility that all the separate disputes, enmities and rivalries now in play can be confined to their separate boxes and that the Israel-Palestinian war in Gaza produces regional fires, but no all-consuming conflagration that would directly involve any of the big powers. And it is possible to interpret what the Houthis and Iran are doing as exploiting an overall climate of instability to pursue objectives of their own: the Houthis to consolidate their position in Yemen; Iran to reinforce regime power against essentially internal enemies based abroad.

But it is not clear that either would be resorting to military power, as they are, without the sense that international rules that had held for many years were now effectively suspended – beginning with the Hamas attacks and hostage-taking of 7 October, and continuing with the destructive scale of Israel’s response.

Thus far, Iran appears to be resisting what might be seen as a chance to emerge as the dominant power in the region by bringing all the disparate strands together, and it may well be too weak to do so. It has not intervened overtly against Israel from southern Lebanon; it has kept the Houthis’ actions at arm’s length, apparently not wanting to jeopardise the chance of peace with the Saudis over Yemen. Its missile attacks have been limited to immediate border areas and existing disputes, and its internal security is far from perfect – witness the recent attack in Kerman, claimed by Isis, on the anniversary of the death of security chief, Qasem Soleimani, and the still seething unrest about rules on women covering their hair.

What cannot be ignored, however, is that what has spread out from Gaza is a growing sense of permissiveness, a diminution of restraint and a readiness on all sides to resort to arms. When we look back at these months, what will we see: a collection of small interests being pursued on the fringe of the enduring, and insoluble, contest for land between Israel and Palestinians – a collection of interests and actions that remain distinct and fizzle out – or a sequence of inevitably escalating moves that will appear in history textbooks as the causes of the next world war?

As so often, it would probably be wise to hope for the best – but prepare for the worst.