We’ve passed the first anniversary of the Ukraine war – there won’t be a second

The first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was marked, as was fitting, with raw personal emotion and grave official solemnity. Just one week on, however, and the focus – or so it seems – has shifted; at least outside Ukraine.

From looking back, the tendency now is to look forward. And where until now that forward-looking view, in so far as it was expressed, could be summed up as “Onward to a glorious Ukrainian victory!”, the tone has suddenly become a little less confident. A sliver of doubt seems to be creeping in.

That applies even in the UK, which has been one of the staunchest believers in an outright Ukrainian victory, in its official statements, as in its think-tank assessments and its mainstream media reporting. We will be in this, so the mantra still runs, “for as long as it takes, whatever it takes”.

In this, the perspective from the UK has had more in common with Poland and the Baltic states than with some of our nearer neighbours, such as France and Germany, where doubts have been closer to the surface. Or even the United States, where the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, and think tank the Rand Corporation have questioned Ukraine’s chances of winning.

The greater uniformity of views in the UK is why the slight shift of tone following the anniversary is worth noting. Nor are the doubts coming primarily from peaceniks on the left – though Jeremy Corbyn has remained true to his anti-war self. The rumbling, to the extent that it can be heard, is coming more from the right.

The lead article in this week’s Spectator magazine asks. “Is Putin winning? The world order is changing in his favour”. The introduction to this week’s CapX bulletin from the free-market Centre for Policy Studies asks, “What price peace”, pointing out that while the war has been a disaster for Russia, it “can hardly be said to have gone ‘well’ for Ukraine when millions of its people have fled and tens of thousands died”. This week’s Sunday Times editorial called on the prime minister to “level with the British public” about the long-term cost to the UK.

Rumblings can be detected, too, in the defence and security circles. While the defence secretary, Ben Wallace, has been lobbying – pre-Budget – for more money to “finish the job”, the armed forces minister, James Heappey, has conceded that by supplying Ukraine to the extent it has – especially with ammunition – the UK’s own stocks have been seriously depleted. There have also been whisperings to the effect that the UK may now lack the capability to honour its obligations to the Nato alliance.

One possible trigger for this shift in outlook might be the anniversary itself, when expert opinion seemed to agree that both Ukraine and Russia were preparing for the long haul and that we would be marking another anniversary this time next year.

Has the prospect of another year perhaps concentrated minds as to what exactly this might mean? Will, for instance, Ukraine’s Western allies have both the material capability and the political will to continue their support for Kyiv even at the current level?

The very airing of such a question is one reason why I, for one, doubt very much that the war will still be being waged, at least in its current form, this time next year. This does not mean that any one of a wide variety of endgames will necessarily come to pass.

At the extreme end of wishful thinking comes total victory for Ukraine, including the recovery of Crimea and a Russian retreat that could result in the overthrow of Vladimir Putin and even the disintegration of Russia. At the opposite end – rarely if ever mentioned – would be the capitulation of Ukraine and the imposition, one way or another, of Russian rule.

In between comes a reversion to the situation as it was on the eve of the war, with Crimea under Russian occupation and the Donbas still in dispute, or the situation pretty much as it is now, with Russia claiming the 15-20 per cent of eastern Ukraine that it seized and has retained as its land bridge to Crimea. Some of the cards on the table might be Ukraine’s membership or not of Nato, the long-term status of the Donbas and possibly, in the even longer term, the status of Crimea.

Eventually, one or another option may form the basis of negotiation. With neither side showing the slightest appetite even for a ceasefire, however, everything remains hypothetical. As of now, Ukraine will settle for nothing less than the restoration of its borders as they were in 1991, which includes the recovery of Crimea, and President Zelensky says he will not negotiate with Putin.

Russia for its part is sticking – mostly – to the objectives it set on the eve of the invasion, which include no Nato prospective for Ukraine, and annexation of most of the land to the southeast bank of the river Dnieper. Russia has periodically said that it was prepared to talk, but not on the terms set by Kyiv.

What this stalemate conceals, however, is that this is not just a war between Russia and Ukraine. And while Ukraine’s Western allies insist they will do “whatever it takes”, this is not quite the truth. Probe just a little, and the pledges look a lot less open-ended.

Will the US, or the UK, send fighter aircraft? Well, no, not now. Will Germany send Leopard tanks? Well, yes, but only if the US also sends battle tanks, which it sort of says it will, but only a few and not quite now.

Ukraine’s Western allies may have provided a lot more – and a lot heavier – weapons than they initially envisaged. But how much further will – and can – the undertakings go?

The gap between rhetoric and reality is growing – including, crucially, in Washington. And for all that Ukraine insists that it alone will decide how the war ends – and for all that, in words, its allies agree – the day may well come when the US, if not others, says enough is enough. The first duty of any democratic government is to its people, and next year is an election year for the US.

Nor, in current circumstances, is it obvious that Ukraine can win, as it defines winning. It has been bogged down in the northeast of the Donbas for months now, and there are reports that Kyiv – which does not publish its losses – is having difficulty recruiting new troops.

Russia’s losses may be heavier but how much heavier, proportionately? That is a key question. Nor, unlike Ukraine, is it militarily dependent on other countries, and Western sanctions have not had the isolating effect that was intended.

Given all these circumstances, it is hard to see how Ukraine will still be fighting this time next year. Or, to put the same proposition another way: at what point does the US – and maybe others – start to exert pressure on Ukraine to talk, or link arms supplies to diplomacy?

Rumour has it that overtures may have already begun. The US and Russia have a channel of communication, as was shown by the notice Washington gave to Moscow of Biden’s visit to Kyiv. A steady stream of US visitors, including the treasury secretary Janet Yellen, have made their way to Kyiv.

One partly face-saving mechanism might be to define any peace plan as interim, leaving the possibility that a stronger Ukraine might one day force Russia out of Crimea, when its land bridge would become redundant. As of now, though, any end to the war is unlikely to be on better terms for Ukraine than were on offer before Russia invaded. That would be desperately hard for Ukraine to accept but not as hard as it would be to fight on with less or no Western military support.

It would also be the logical answer to the questions of the material and other costs now being broached, as yet quietly, in the US – and even here in the UK.

It is also why I will risk the prediction that the war will not see its second anniversary – or if it does, it will only be because recklessness on all sides allowed a regional conflict to explode into world war three.