Trump made a savvy psychological evaluation of Kim Jong-un – so should we trust his judgment on Iran?

The last great showman in the White House was Ronald Reagan, a one-time Hollywood film actor, who kept his sense of dramatic timing to the end. But Donald Trump (former host of US TV show The Apprentice) promises to run him close, if the staging of the latest development in the North Korea rapprochement is anything to judge by.

It is the early hours of morning. Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington is clothed in darkness. But a special flight is preparing to land, and the President and First Lady have broken their slumbers to welcome home three Americans held by North Korea.

The erstwhile prisoners’ families are at the airport, too, for the tearful reunion. One of those released says it is like a dream. But it is also an all-American moment, of which recent US presidents have produced oh so few.

The television pictures of the prisoners’ return are the perfect prelude to the main act: the Donald and Kim show. The second perfect prelude, in fact. The first was the North-South Korean leaders’ handshake across the demilitarised zone at Panmunjom. And the warm-up act for that was the joint Korean team at the Winter Olympics. From winter to spring, how much distance has been travelled.

And it looks – though in matters of personality and diplomacy, you never quite know – as though one of the least probable turns in international relations of recent times is on course to be accomplished: the bringing in of North Korea from the cold. What is more, it would be fair to say that this would not have happened – or not have happened with such speed – without the intervention, and instincts, of Donald Trump.

Before Trump, successive US presidents had tried to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsula with varying degrees of success. But none were willing to take the triple gamble that Trump took: first, that the aggressive bark of the young North Korean leader disguised a far weaker bite; second, that the nuclear belligerence was born not of strength, but of insecurity; and third, that what young Kim was after above all was acceptance for himself and his country, and that he would be prepared to make significant concessions for that.

This, pretty much, is the psychological calculation that Trump made – against all manner of warnings from experts and advisers – and, as of now, it would appear he was right. What Kim Jong-un sought was a one-on-one meeting with the US President, such as other national leaders are routinely granted, with his support team, due ceremony and his national flag. In granting this, Trump was prepared to risk the dignity of his office, as no previous US President had.

With Singapore now confirmed as the venue, and both sides apparently deep in their preparations, there are still those counselling caution. But that is to misunderstand what is going on. The point of this meeting is not any communique or specific results, it is the fact that it is happening. Without it, there can be no long-term suspension, or even cessation, of North Korea’s nuclear programme, there is no prospect of a nuclear-free region, and no chance of any progress from the current armistice to a peace treaty. With the transformation of the US – in Pyongyang’s eyes – from adversary to peace sponsor, perhaps there can.

Before Trump is fast-tracked (courtesy of Boris Johnson) to a Nobel peace rize, however, for services to detente in Northeast Asia, there is another example of Trump’s instinctive diplomacy that has to be considered, and here – to put it mildly – the outlook does not look so good.

Even as North Korea’s three erstwhile prisoners were winging their way to the United States, a new front was being opened in the ever-shifting conflict in the Middle East. After keeping a mostly low profile in the Syrian war to date, Israel launched what were described as massive strikes on Iranian targets in response to Iranian missile attacks on the (Israeli-occupied) Golan Heights.

The raids followed Donald Trump’s withdrawal of US support for the Iran nuclear deal, against very public and personal pleas from the Europeans.

Trump appeared to accept the warnings from Republican hawks and intense lobbying from Israel, which views the advance of Iranian interests into Syria as a direct threat to its security.

But, as the world should know by now, this US President tends not to do as he is told, or advised; instead he does what he feels to be right in the context of his mantra “America First”. And there was a lot about the Iran nuclear deal that he personally disliked: it was an example, as he saw it, of Obama’s tendency to appease; it was a multilateral arrangement and, where others saw productive diplomatic ambiguity, he saw potentially threatening security holes.

Now perhaps his judgement is right. If he has read North Korea correctly, as he would appear to have done, should he perhaps be trusted again? Has his high-stakes approach, as some argue, taken the measure of Iran, with the result that some amendments to the deal can be agreed that will assuage US fears.

Well, maybe. But the psychology of Kim – a sole leader backed into a corner through 60-plus years of his country’s isolation – looks simple, compared with that of today’s Iran. The history, the geography, the cultural considerations and the competing factions within the leadership all make it much harder for outsiders to second-guess its response – beyond the defensive flag-burning – and harder, too, for its leaders to change direction quickly, even if they were inclined to, or at all.

So, if Trump can extract some concessions, good luck to him. But the risk of introducing a new element of uncertainty into a regional situation that is already so unstable is enormous. And if the Europeans cannot convince Tehran to keep its side of the bargain for a while yet, Trump’s gamble could prompt a new conflagration in the Middle East, as foreshadowed in the latest military action by Israel and Iran.

Not only that, but if the model for Pyongyang is no longer a compliant Iran, but an Iran that feels it has no alternative but to resume its nuclear ambitions, all prospect of that Nobel peace prize will be lost. Showmanship may be part of being an effective American president, but judgement belongs in the equation, too, and a sound reading of North Korea will not, by itself, be enough.