In the wake of mutiny, Putin’s weakened but far from finished

If the minute-by-minute dramas of last weekend in Russia seem both a long way away and a long time ago, that is because a great many people want you to think that, or want you to see it in a new light. I can hardly remember a single episode in recent years that has passed so quickly from reality to myth – and competing myths at that.

But first, what is the actual situation in terms of politics and power now that the immediate dust has settled? Vladimir Putin is back in the Kremlin and wants you to know that he is in charge; that his authority is intact, and that he remains determined to run Russia and continue the war against Ukraine.

He has been more visible in recent days than for many months, including presiding at a military ceremony in the Kremlin’s Cathedral Square and leading a staged “walkabout” in the southern region of Dagestan. Russian missiles struck a popular restaurant in the Ukrainian city of Kramatorsk.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, chief mutineer and the leader of the Wagner mercenary force, which halted its northward advance more than half way to Moscow after taking control of Russia’s southern military command without a fight, is now said to be in Belarus. The Russian Security Service, the FSB, announced that it had dropped the single charge against him – of armed insurrection – soon after a plane “associated with” him landed in Minsk.

His fighters, who number anywhere between 10,000 and 25,000, have the choice of signing contracts with Russia’s regular armed forces; returning to their homes, or joining their commander in Belarus – where a base is apparently being prepared. Whether Prigozhin will remain in Belarus or maybe de-camp to concentrate on Wagner’s activities in Africa is unclear.

Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko meanwhile is riding high, in his own eyes at least. He boasts of brokering the agreement under which Prigozhin halted his troops, of essentially saving Putin’s skin and of rescuing Prigozhin from Putin’s wrath. It is not known what more tangible reward Lukashenko might have received for his trouble, but his hold on power – which was threatened by the protests of 2020-21 – looks more secure than it has for a long time.

Beyond these three leading players, there have been other shifts. In Ukraine, there was much grass-roots jubilation at the news from Russia. But it was less apparent at the top, where President Zelensky and others took a more cautious view, with any idea that Ukraine could capitalise on Moscow’s discomfort on the battlefield being played down.

If there are to be changes in the dynamic of the fighting – a new offensive push by Ukraine, say, or a loss of morale on the Russian side – they have yet to be seen. Kyiv also seems – not unreasonably – concerned about what a sudden change (or collapse) of power in Moscow could mean. Prigozhin, after all, was no dove; his complaint was that the Russian high command was incompetent and had let Kyiv off the hook.

Some European countries, especially the Baltic States, were worried about the new proximity of Wagner troops, if a sizable number now base themselves in Belarus – although Kyiv says they do not see them as a threat. The official response of other Europeans and the United States to developments in Russia also erred on the side of caution, with disclaimers about any Western involvement with Prigozhin and anxiety about possible disorder in Russia.

A post-Putin era suddenly seemed a lot closer, and not necessarily such an improvement in practice as it had seemed in theory. The spectre of Prigozhin, or a Prigozhin figure, in charge – or perhaps worse, not in charge – of Russia’s nuclear arsenal was suddenly a consideration.

So this is, as far as it is possible to discern, how the chess pieces look, a week on from Prigozhin’s abandoned march on Moscow, with a lot of open questions about what happens next: how serious a dent has been made in Putin’s authority? Could Prigozhin be back? What effect might there be, if any, on the course of the war? And might some in the West now be more fearful of a Russian collapse than of defeat for Ukraine?

It would seem to be in an attempt to influence what happens next that both Moscow and its adversaries have embarked on some energetic “spinning”, from which two, quite contrary, versions are now emerging.

The new Moscow narrative is this: thanks to his firm hand on the tiller and a united team, the president saved the state from the scourge of civil war. Then, as now, the president enjoys huge popular support. Prigozhin’s plan was to capture the Russian defence minister and chief of general staff, and he embarked on his march only when that plan failed.

When people turned out in the streets of Rostov-on-Don to applaud the Wagner fighters, it was in relief at their departure, not to thank them. We know who supported Prigozhin; they were small fry, but we will pursue them without mercy. It was the Wagner commanders who are the traitors; many of their fighters on the other hand deserve credit for their achievements on the Ukrainian battlefield. If they pledge their loyalty to the government, they will not be touched.

All of which contradicts in many ways how things appeared at the time. What we saw then were two unscheduled, unusually timed and unfocused, nationwide broadcasts by the president, who threatened not to spare traitors and warned of civil war. In between, he had apparently decamped to a residence near St Petersburg or a presidential bunker in the Valdai region. Defences were reinforced around Moscow.

There were then mixed messages about whether Prigozhin would face charges or not, before a distinction was drawn between treacherous commanders and courageous fighters. There was the sense of a real power vacuum. It was not until Monday that other government members came out of the woodwork, and then it was with calls to rally round the president. There were no street demonstrations in his favour. For the best part of 24 hours, Russia’s nerve centre for command of the Ukraine war had been under the control of the mutineers. All that uncertainty has now been blotted out by a heroic narrative in which the president saved the state.

In the meantime, a counter-narrative has been gaining currency, and airtime, on the other side, which may be equally misleading. This is not just that Putin has been weakened, but that his days are numbered, and that even if Prigozhin appeared a lone wolf, he enjoyed the patronage of influential members of Russia’s top brass – including that of a former commander in the Ukraine war, Sergei Surovikin, who may or may not now be under arrest.

This version goes on to argue that, even though Prigozhin denied he was mounting an actual coup, his move constituted an open challenge to the Kremlin, and could be followed by more. The overall message is that Putin’s Kremlin is hopelessly split, over the Ukraine war as over much else, that Putin is only just hanging on to power, and that he could be gone tomorrow – an eventuality everyone needs to prepare for.

Now, of course it is prudent for everyone to prepare for contingencies, including the precipitate departure of the Russian president. But if there were splits in the Kremlin, they seem to have been overcome for the time being, and it is hard not to see the ever more speculative accounts of splits in the Kremlin as designed to speed a desired outcome: the downfall of Vladimir Putin, and/or the disintegration of Russia. These are both eventualities, it might be recalled, that senior US officials have on occasion mentioned as objectives.

Yes, there was a serious wobble at the top of Russia last weekend, but Putin remains president – albeit a weaker president – and for the moment there is no obvious alternative in the wings. What happened might be a warning or a promise of what could be to come, but it’s important to resist the spin and remember how it really was. Wishful thinking risks rebounding badly, for either side.