In the event of a conflict, Nato would face Russian forces re-equipped and re-trained by the Syrian war

British troops are to be stationed in Estonia from May 2017, as part of a Nato plan to improve the defences of its front-line states. This is a small but essential step to discourage possible assertive moves by Russia. The geography of the Baltic means that being in place before a crisis is essential – because after it begins is too late. Russia has been practising for years at blocking access to the region, and for Nato to fight its way through to protect its allies would be vastly harder than simply being present to start with.

Local populations in the host countries are pleased to see Nato troops arrive as a concrete demonstration of commitment to their security. According to Estonia’s defence minister, British commitment to European security and collective defence feels stronger after Brexit.

The international units also serve as a concrete indicator of the commitment to European security by Nato’s North American members. A change of government in Canada had led to questions over the depth of this commitment – but Canadian leadership of the battalion to be stationed in Latvia has resolved these questions.

But forward deployment also exposes UK and other Nato soldiers to a wide range of new threats and challenges. In the event of a conflict, they would face Russian forces re-equipped and re-trained based on operational experience in Ukraine and Syria. Russia’s exercises involving huge numbers of its troops have been accompanied by intensive practice for war in Syria. This includes using as many weapons systems there as possible in order to test them, even when they are not the most suitable or efficient for the job. For instance, sailing the carrier Admiral Kuznetsov to the eastern Mediterranean instead of using local airbase facilities. Many member states are now once again realising the importance of high-end fighting for territorial defence, following 20 years of running down their armed forces and focusing on expeditionary warfare.

But as a first step towards Nato defending the front-line states, size is not the only thing that matters. Critically, a multinational presence in these states make it far more complicated for Russia to take any military action against them without immediately involving the rest of Nato.

Although the redeployment of Nato troops most directly affects the host countries and Russia, other states in the region will feel the side effects. Sweden and Finland are continuing their long-running debate over whether they would be safer within Nato or remaining outside. But one key argument against greater Nato involvement in the region – concern that new military deployments there could be provocative – has receded in the face of Russia's intensive drive for mobilisation and militarisation.

New Russian moves like the deployment of Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, or the arrival in the Baltic of Russian corvettes with cruise missiles, mean that Sweden and Finland’s desire to appear peaceful and unprovocative has been overtaken by reality. When Russia has already made threats of using nuclear weapons in the region, some in Sweden now feel that defensive preparations could hardly make the situation worse.

Belarus, meanwhile, looks at both Russia’s and Nato’s military moves with alarm. Unlike Russia, whose claims of being “encircled” by Nato are based on fantasy, for Belarus this is already a fact: the landlocked country is already surrounded by military buildup and conflict on all sides. How Belarus will respond to this, and to Russian offers of “protection” from Nato, make for another worrying potential flashpoint in eastern Europe.

Fears of Russian escalation in response are misplaced. Nato’s actions have been signalled so far in advance that Russia has had plenty of time to already massively out-escalate Nato, which in turn is now only beginning to catch up. What is important is putting in place counter-measures to the Russian military potential that already exists in the region, in order to reduce the number of options for assertive military action which are available to Russia.

There is no shortage of scenarios and candidates for where Russia might next choose to exercise its growing military potential. But discussion of where and when this might happen often overlooks the fact that Russia is unlikely to initiate any direct confrontation “just because”. What is needed is both an opportunity for Russia to take action unchallenged, and some form of crisis that triggers this action. These new defensive measures by Nato, as and when they take place, will be an important step toward reducing Russia’s opportunities. In this way they make northern Europe a safer place.