Letter: Intervention: the historical record

Sir: Your support for 'a benign imperium' (leading article, 1 December) for Somalia in the form of a UN-authorised and US-implemented protectorate warrants greater circumspection.

The prevalence of weak or virtually non-existent governments capable of invoking sovereign prerogatives, coupled with the absence of a Soviet counterbalance, means that Western intervention may prove irresistible. But the historical record of intervention, and the role of international law in its legitimation, gives scant support for thinking that any imperium will be benign.

Since the origins of modern international law in the 17th century, international lawyers have provided the legitimating principles for Western intervention in its various forms. Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, Locke and others invoked such lofty principles as the Christianising mission, the spread of civilisation and the expansion of trade and wealth to terra nullius (empty land) to justify colonisation, imperialism and the subjugation of indigenous peoples.

In the present era, foreign intervention is again being championed under the currently appealing rubric of 'humanitarian intervention' and international human rights. Earlier experiences of intervention were motivated by self-interest, a questionable faith in the West's 'better knowledge' of other peoples' best interests and idealistic principles that proved to be less than universal. The current vogue for projecting power in the name of human rights may eventually prove as suspect as earlier excursions, and its consequences for the affected parties as unwelcome.

Nor is the American experience with protectorates in chaotic countries a source of encouragement. In one such case, the US Marines occupied Haiti (1916- 1934), allegedly to impose order and cultivate democracy, though the real reason dealt more with an exaggerated perception of a German strategic threat to the Panama Canal. The Marines left better roads, a small telephone exchange and a legacy of racial prejudice. When the troops departed, Haiti returned to chaos.

The use of force is an improbable method for reconciling warring communities. In the end, reconciliation is unlikely until the combatants either exhaust themselves or otherwise recognise that further violence will be inconclusive. Such a recognition may be dawning on the adversaries in Mozambique, South Africa and the Middle East. A truly benign imperium would focus on these zones of conflict and offer Western 'good offices' directed towards institutional and political arrangements which protect the interests of the affected parties, including minorities.

Yours faithfully,

ANDREW SHACKNOVE

Refugee Studies Programme

International Development Centre

University of Oxford

Oxford

2 December