Israel is gripped by the curse of '67

On 5 June 1967 Israeli soldiers entered East Jerusalem and within a few days captured all the land to the west of the Jordan river, as well as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria. The victories were overwhelming and intoxicating.

For 30 years Israel has been trying to absorb part of its conquests and trade the rest for a lasting peace. Even land captured in the first minutes of the war is proving difficult to digest. Despite the Israeli claim to Jerusalem as its eternal and undivided capital, Israeli taxi drivers still routinely refuse to enter the Palestinian districts of Jerusalem.

This week Israelis are, as usual, celebrating the Six-Day War and the reunification of Jerusalem. Tens of thousands of people pour through the streets of the Old City, waving the white and blue Israeli flag. But this year the anniversary has a peculiar significance, of which most of the demonstrators will be unaware.

This year's celebration is important because it marks the failure of the most serious attempt by an Israeli government to escape from the legacy of 1967. That could be done only by ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The Oslo accords of 1993 fell short of what Palestinians wanted but recognised them as a people with rights to their own territory.

Some Israelis always believed that the very extent of their 1967 victory contained a hidden danger. It had created too many enemies. In the West Bank and Gaza Israel had become a colonial occupying power. Confrontation with the Palestinians dominated its agenda to the exclusion of almost everything else. Yossi Beilin, the architect of the Oslo accords, wrote: "Thus, Israel's sensational victory of 1967 became a curse."

It had another effect, which he underestimated. For some Israelis the Six-Day War was not just a glorious victory, but the voice of God. It was his command to the Jews to reclaim the Land of Israel between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean Sea. Religious extremism bonded with territorial nationalism. Retreat from the land God gave to the Jews was treachery. Inspired by that vision, Yigal Amir, a student of religion, shot dead Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister, who had been Israeli chief of staff in 1967.

Benjamin Netanyahu, the new Israeli prime minister, chose this year's anniversary of 1967 to unveil his vision of a final settlement with the Palestinians. It shows that Oslo is dead. On offer are four truncated cantons based on Gaza, Hebron, Nablus and Jericho.

Is Mr Netanyahu right to believe that Israel can hold on to most of what it captured 30 years ago? In his books and in his election campaign he said that the way to deal with Palestinians and Arabs is to stand up to them; lower their expectations and they will take whatever is on offer. And in the short term there is evidence that he is proving to be right. Despite the furious reaction of Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, to the building of an Israeli settlement for 6,500 people at Har Homa, called Jabal Abu Ghneim by Palestinians, protests have fizzled out. The Arab states have not reacted strongly and the US vetoed two UN resolutions condemning Har Homa.

But in the long term Mr Netanyahu's policy presupposes a permanent confrontation between the 3.25 million Palestinians and 5.5 million Jews living in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. And the lesson of the years since 1967 is that Israel's military might is less and less effective in solving its political problems. For this week also marks an Israeli military anniversary which is not being celebrated or even mentioned.

This was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 15 years ago. On 4 June 1982 the Israeli army crossed the border in the "Peace for Galilee" operation. The aim was to destroy the PLO, drive Syria out of Lebanon and install a pro-Israeli Christian government in Beirut. It failed dismally on all three counts. Nor was that the only failure of military power to produce results. Israel found that military superiority was not enough to deal with the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 1987. Last year the Grapes of Wrath operation, the bombardment of south Lebanon, failed to damage the Hizbollah guerrillas.

Arabs often regard Israel as wholly hypocritical in demanding special attention to its security needs, while doing everything to threaten the security of its neighbours. But in fact Israel is less of a regional super- power than it looks. A long-term result of 1967 was to increase Israeli dependence on the US. The real shift in the Middle East since the Six- Day War is not the growth of Israeli strength so much as the predominance of the US.

At first the Gulf crisis and war seemed likely boost the chances of a rapprochement between Israel and the Arab states. In Saddam Hussein there was an enemy whom other Arab leaders hated and feared even more than they did Israel. The US also wanted to consolidate its Gulf War alliance by brokering an Arab-Israeli agreement. President Bush in 1991-92 put serious pressure on Israel not to build settlements, and to negotiate with the Palestinians. Unfortunately the US position in the Middle East is now so strong that the absence of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement does not make much difference. Iraq, the only Arab state with oil and a powerful army, remains isolated. President Clinton learnt too well from the fate of Mr Bush in the 1992 election that there was a heavy political price to pay for offending Israel (Jimmy Carter made the same discovery in 1980).

In announcing its peace proposal this week the Israeli government said it was half-way between a full return to the 1967 borders and a total takeover of the Land of Israel. That apparently means returning 40 per cent of the West Bank. Israeli settlements will stay. As a peace proposal it has the disadvantage of not producing peace. The confrontation between Israel and Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza which has raged since the Six-Day War will be institutionalised. The curse of Israel's 1967 victory retains its power.