The killing of Hamas’ second-in-command risks wider war in the Middle East

The death of Saleh al-Arouri in what was described as a “surgical strike” deep in southern Beirut bears all the hallmarks of an assassination signed off and carried out by Israel. Mr Arouri was not only the number two in the political leadership of Hamas, but a founder and commander of its military wing and the link, it was reported, between Hamas and Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon. As such, he was a key figure.

Israel has not so far, and may never, admit responsibility for the killing of Mr Arouri, who is the most senior Hamas leader known to have been killed since Israel’s prime minister vowed to “destroy Hamas”, following the attacks of 7 October. But the answers to all the standard questions point incontrovertibly in Israel’s direction: who had the motivation, the intelligence and the military capability to do the deed? Above all, who stands to benefit from his death?

The answer to the last question, however, may not be quite as unequivocal as it might appear. As seen from the protests that broke out immediately in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, the death of Mr Arouri – and of the five others who died with him – could rebound on Israel, which has already been fighting longer and at greater cost than it had surely envisaged. In particular, it could further damage any chances Israel may still have of securing the return of the remaining hostages held by Hamas.

The still bigger risk, though, is that a war that has so far largely been confined to Gaza, albeit with a huge cost in Palestinian lives, could now spread across the whole region. Emmanuel Macron, the French president, was the first of many national leaders to warn of the dangers, specifically calling on Israel not to escalate the war into Lebanon. The foreign minister of Lebanon also entered the fray, on the one hand calling the killing a “war crime” that warranted a UN investigation, while on the other hand appealing to Hezbollah not to respond. A similar message came from a spokesperson for the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, who warned that a wider conflict would have devastating consequences for both Israel and Lebanon, and urged all sides to show restraint.

The specific danger arises from the fact that the attack on Mr Arouri was not just an attack on Hamas, but a violation of a third country’s – Lebanon’s – sovereignty, and a challenge to the supposed protection afforded to Hamas by Hezbollah. The risk now is that Hezbollah abandons the relative restraint it has exercised hitherto, and responds with a full-scale attack on northern Israel, backed by its patron, Iran. Were Iran to enter the conflict directly – or be seen to do so – that could bring in the United States and the UK.

There were widespread fears from the very start that, once Israeli forces entered Gaza, the conflict could and would soon extend beyond that narrow coastal strip. The danger was less that Hamas itself would expand the theatre of war, but that others would wade in on its behalf, seeing Israel’s attack on Gaza as an attack on all Palestinians, and offering others an opportunity for a wider reckoning.

Until now, the – rare – positive news has been that this has not happened. Indeed, there has seemed to be a distinct reluctance on the part of most big powers – the United States, Russia, China, and regional powers such as Iran, Egypt and the Gulf States – to become involved, either directly or as a proxy. The apparent decision of Hezbollah not to force Israel to defend a second front to its north was of particular note and seen as evidence that Iran had no appetite for a fight.

Nor has it been clear how far Iran has supported – or not – the attacks by Houthi rebels from Yemen to attack shipping in the Red Sea as a gesture of solidarity with the Palestinians and an attempt to put pressure on Israel and its allies to scale back the offensive in Gaza. On other potential fronts, Egypt and Turkey have kept a generally low profile.

The US, for its part, has seemed to be blowing hot and cold, in response to conflicting political winds in Washington. It has sent increasing amounts of military hardware to the region, while calling on Israel, in public and in private, to scale back its operations in Gaza. Now, though, it would appear that the advantage rests with the Washington doves rather than the hawks, who saw a chance for a strike against Iran.

After two months, the aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald Ford, is to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean to return home. While this may mean little in military terms, symbolically it suggests that President Biden has no appetite for becoming involved in a new war at the start of the presidential election year.

As for other potential parties to any widening conflict, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf States and China have shown more interest in mediation than in actively taking sides. Russia is preoccupied with Ukraine and what remains of its intervention in Syria. The European Union also has its hands full with Ukraine, and what to do if the US seriously reduces its support for the Kyiv government. The UK potentially faces the same dilemma, but could not realistically act on its own in the Middle East without the US or the EU.

In Cold War times, it was often said that Moscow and others made a practice of fishing in troubled waters. What we have seen in the Middle East since 7 October is almost the opposite: a distinct concern on the part of big countries and those in the region to avoid anything that might seriously escalate the conflict, and to try to rein in potentially overambitious proxies. Even those who might be seen as allies of Hamas, such as Hezbollah, have so far kept a distance.

That almost no one, it seems, actually wants a wider war in the Middle East just now, of course, does not mean that it will not happen. The killing of Mr Arouri in Lebanon makes for a highly dangerous moment. And the longer the fighting in Gaza goes on, the more such dangerous moments there are likely to be. The sooner another pause or a ceasefire can be agreed, the better.

But it might also be worth observing: neither the 24/7 news cycle nor history generally have much to say about wars that were, for whatever reason, avoided. Let’s hope that this time next year, we can look back on 2024 and consider not how it was that the Gaza war sparked a conflagration across the Middle East, but how and why a wider war did not happen.