Leading article: A squandered opportunity and a battle being lost

Afghanistan has the grim distinction of having overtaken Iraq as the most dangerous theatre of conflict in which British troops are engaged. Six soldiers have died in Helmand province in the past month. There are reports of up to 10 "contacts" with the enemy every day. Virtually all the British bases in the region are under regular attack. It is unsurprising, in this deadly context, that commanders on the ground have been making clear that they need more men and better air cover.

In one sense, therefore, it is welcome that the Defence Secretary, Des Browne, yesterday announced an additional deployment of 900 troops. The size of the force at present is plainly inadequate. It would be a disgrace if our forces in Afghanistan were asked to continue as they are - undermanned and under-equipped. But for the Government to send more troops to the region without a fundamental re-evaluation of the mission in which they are engaged is just as irresponsible.

Despite Mr Browne's optimistic statement to the Commons yesterday, a deep confusion runs through the British operation in Afghanistan. Our troops are being asked to perform two very different duties at once: an offensive operation against the Taliban and a mission to provide reconstruction projects for the local population. Mr Browne was again keen to stress the reconstruction aspect of the mission yesterday. But the time for reconstruction was immediately after the toppling of the Taliban in 2001. This was when the Afghan people were most well-disposed to the foreign forces that had helped vanquish their oppressors. This was when our Prime Minister promised the Afghan people that, "this time we will not walk away from you". Yet this was also the time when the Bush administration (followed swiftly by our own Government) began to turn its attention to Iraq. The opportunity to rebuild Afghanistan was shamefully squandered.

Now the Taliban have returned in the south and east. And their fighters seem to have learnt some deadly tricks from the insurgents of Iraq. International troops face suicide attacks and roadside bombings, along with the "hit-and-run" ambushes that Afghan fighters have always deployed against foreign occupiers. The Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, always warned that the Taliban would reassert themselves in the absence of a concerted effort to reconstruct Afghanistan. We are reaping the deadly consequences of our failure to heed those warnings.

Our leaders point to the brutality of the Taliban as a reason we must prevail. But the international community must ask itself what alternative to Taliban hegemony they have offered the Afghan people over the past three years? A gulf of distrust exists between our forces and the local population. A major strand of the international strategy in Afghanistan is to see the eradication of the opium crop. Is it any wonder that dirt-poor local farmers have shown no desire to co-operate with forces that would see their major source of income destroyed?

Nato is set to take over the command of the international security forces in the south of the country from the US-led coalition next month. There will be a new British commander, Lieutenant-General David Richards. This provides an opportunity for greater cohesion in the military operation and subtler tactics. But the truth is that the "battle for hearts and minds", about which we used to hear so much, may have already been lost. And there is now a serious danger that this operation will follow the pattern of previous military expeditions in Afghanistan: heavy casualties, strategic failure and, in the end, humiliating withdrawal.