Leading article: A conflict that has cost Georgia's democracy dear

With the order given by Russia's President, Dmitry Medvedev, for a halt to military operations against Georgia, this summer's small war in the Caucasus looks as though it is coming to an end. The brevity and precision of Mr Medvedev's televised statement made for a sharp contrast with President Mikheil Saakashvili's rambling address to massed ranks of Georgians at a rally in Tbilisi and left no doubt about which side had emerged the victor.

Short – and nasty – this conflict may have been, but it leaves many mysteries behind it. We still have no accurate idea of the extent of casualties or the scale of the damage. While there is much human suffering and many refugees – alas, these are inevitable consequences of the resort to arms – latest reports from the ground suggest that both sides may have exaggerated their losses.

Perhaps the biggest mystery, though, is why Georgia decided to take on Russia now. Of course, the situation had long been profoundly unsatisfactory from Georgia's point of view: two chunks of its country – South Ossetia and Abkhazia – were outside its control and undisguised platforms for Russian trouble-making. But this state of affairs had pertained for the best part of 15 years. The dispute should have been soluble by diplomatic means.

If Russia intended a recent increase in skirmishing to lure the Georgians into a war they could not win, the tactic worked to perfection. If not, we have to ask what convinced Mr Saakashvili that Georgia could reclaim South Ossetia by force and – perhaps – what assurances he might have thought he had from Washington. In any event, the enterprise bespoke extraordinary recklessness. Mr Saakashvili might have led his country to democracy – a thoroughly admirable achievement – but challenging an increasingly-nationalistic Russia so close to its volatile southern border was likely to be a gamble too far.

The most immediate cost will be Tbilisi's hopes of integrating the enclaves into Georgia proper. Their populations will be even warier of Georgian rule and even more intent on keeping Russia's protection. There could also be a cost to Mr Saakashvili's authority, if his people judge that his hotheadedness contributed to his country's defeat.

The greater, and longer-term, cost will be Georgia's ambition to become accepted as a fully paid up member of the Western world, through membership of the European Union, but especially Nato. When the Europeans delayed Georgia's first step towards Nato membership last April, against the wishes of the United States, it was because they feared the very scenario that has just played out – except that the allies would have been bound by treaty to go to Georgia's aid. It is now not only Georgia's ambitions that have been set back, but also those of Ukraine – though never as single-minded an applicant as Georgia.

But East-West relations – the term seems suddenly relevant again – have also suffered in the wake of this six-day war. In repelling Georgia's assault on South Ossetia, Russia continued hostilities for longer, and moved far deeper into Georgian territory, than was required to eject Georgian troops from the enclave. President Medvedev yesterday rejected accusations that Russia was intent on "regime change" in Georgia. But removing Mr Saakashvili now is not necessary. Russia's barely contested military sweep into Georgia was a flexing of its muscles that leaves it undisputed master of the region once again. The red lines of a new power balance have been drawn.