It is foolish to rely on mercenaries for security

Thinking the unthinkable is a praiseworthy occupation for government servants, who tend to be all too hide-bound. So a Foreign Office Green Paper that considers how best to assist overstretched national and UN forces in the fast-growing area of international peace-keeping should not automatically be dismissed out of hand.

The use of mercenaries, however, whether for national or international security, is most definitely a step too far. Contracting out to private companies, agencies or other intermediate types of administration has a place in efficient government, and there are functions that private companies, agencies and the rest perform better than governments. But running and staffing the armed forces is categorically not one of them.

If a national government has any role at all in guaranteeing the country's security, it must recruit and maintain the country's armed forces. To delegate this function is to abdicate an essential responsibility of government. It also raises immense questions of accountability and sovereignty.

Armed forces must have a direct line of command and they must be subject to political control. Buying in mercenaries would be tantamount to privatising national security. Doubts would exist about the legitimacy both of the force and of the government that purchased it. The Green Paper proposes that many of these risks could be averted by government regulation and the licensing of mercenary armies – or, as the Foreign Office delicately calls them, "private military companies". But it would be nigh impossible to check up on their conduct in a theatre of war – which is, after all, where they would generally be deployed.

Among the more seductive arguments in favour of delegating security or peace-keeping to a private company is that a well-regulated mercenary force might be better disciplined and more respectful of human rights than some government armies – as well it might. But the conclusion to be drawn from that is not "bring on the mercenaries", but that deficient national armies need improved training. If any public money is going begging, it should be spent on bringing regular armies up to standard, not on buying substitute forces from elsewhere.

Unfettered thinking is fine in theory. But too much is at stake in national and international security to risk mistakes. The world of theory is where "privatised peace" should remain.