A Final Say is the only way to settle the Brexit question once and for all

There are many arguments for an early general election. There are also quite a few, with rather greater potency, for not troubling the electorate at this time of year, and for the government to get on with the job of getting Brexit and other legislation through parliament.

However, the one argument that simply doesn’t wash is that a snap election will end the Brexit trauma.

First comes a matter of logic and principle: the general election is the wrong answer to the Brexit question. The question is not so much about who runs the country as whether we now wish to leave the EU on the agreed (so far as they are) terms.

If the people began this process in the 2016 EU referendum, logically and practically, the question of what they now wish to do about Brexit has to be delivered in a clear and unambiguous form in a Final Say referendum. A general election cannot do that.

It might be argued that, in the (unlikely) event of a Commons majority for the Liberal Democrats or the Brexit Party, such a result would represent a de facto mandate for revoke or no deal respectively. There would always be room for too much debate and uncertainty about what the population “really” wanted. It would be neither binding nor in any real sense decisive.

Apart from that, there is the obvious fact that a general election campaign will inevitably turn for different voters on different issues. The polarisation of British politics over the past four years or so into a sort of culture war has skewed everything. Brexit remains for many the overriding and defining issue for both sides. For many voters, though, other issues will take precedence, and the manner in which they will drive the vote is difficult to predict. Many British electors have now fully liberated themselves from traditional party ties.

The intervention or revival of smaller parties could also lead to an inconclusive result, on Brexit and much else. The long-term trend for the two larger parties to dominate political loyalties and argument was bucked at the 2017 election. Yet all the signs are that disruption is about to resume. Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party is a far more formidable force than Ukip was in its final years, and the Liberal Democrats have found an unexpected boost since their drubbings in 2015 and 2017. The Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru are also stronger contenders in their nations, taking votes from the various unionist parties. It is perfectly possible, for example, that the Conservatives will be wiped out in Scotland even as they win a majority in the UK as a whole.

There will also be a larger than usual cohort of incumbent “independent” MPs standing this time, such as Frank Field or Philip Hammond, again with unpredictable consequences.

Matters are complicated by the timing of the election. The colder, darker evenings are far from ideal for campaigning and canvassing, and which parties earn a net marginal advantage from this is unclear – and perhaps it matters less anyway in the digital age. The nation has not seen a wintry election since February 1974, and there is little evidence therefore about how it will affect the vote among the older generations and among students (given term dates). If the election turns out to be a closer-run affair that it now seems, then such small factors could make a difference.

Boris Johnson’s strategy has already had a practice run under Theresa May – with mixed results. She too decided that her Brexit deal, as it was developing, could not pass the existing House of Commons, even though she inherited a slender majority from David Cameron. So she went to the country to win her own mandate – and failed rather spectacularly to do so during a long and often poorly run campaign.

Mr Johnson looks to be a formable figure on the stump, but no one can know how he will in fact perform. Some of his public appearances since he stood for leader in the summer have been disappointing to say the least. By contrast, Jeremy Corbyn visibly enjoys engaging with a crowd, and has spent most of his political life preaching to the unconverted. However, unlike in 2017, he is now a very familiar figure, and his faults have come more to the fore. More importantly, the ambiguous Brexit policy he pursued in 2017 worked well then, but today’s version seems to be winning few friends on either side. He may find himself relying too heavily on a core Labour vote of about a fifth of the electorate: That is not enough to form even a minority administration backed by other parties.

The British general election of 2019, then, is likely to be a scrappy affair in more senses than one. Neither main party is being entirely frank with the electorate about their Brexit policies, and both parties are vulnerable on a variety of policy areas. Mr Johnson will soon discover that “traditional” Labour voters will not have fallen in love with him, even if they sympathise with his views on Brexit. They may turn to Nigel Farage, or they may be so disillusioned they just do not vote.

Jo Swinson will also see how far 18 per cent of the national vote will get her – more MPs, yes, but nowhere near enough to be a kingmaker in a hung parliament.

The election may settle very little, and Brexit purgatory could merely resume where it left off. By the time the nation sits down for its Christmas dinner it may have no more idea of what the future holds than it does today.