Boris Johnson is looking to have his cake and eat it over foreign policy. It is a risky move

Global Britain” is a slogan the country has got used to in the Brexit era, though it remains as vacuous as ever. The government’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy is, predictably enough, subtitled “Global Britain in a Competitive Age”.

It is supposed to add some armour-plated, high-tech substance to the all-too-familiar soundbite. It fails to do so. The prime minister, Boris Johnson, says Britain will no longer be confined to the “cramped horizons” of a regional foreign policy. But without economic superpower status, all this proves is that Britain has left Europe, but not yet found a role.

Like most things associated with Mr Johnson, the ambitious document is consistent with his publicly stated overriding principle of statecraft – having your cake and eating it. Apparently, the UK can cheerfully exit the largest trading bloc on the planet, with its vast interlocking webs of diplomatic and commercial contacts and economic clout, and still project great power across the Earth’s surface. The prime minister wants to turn Britain into a “science superpower”, which is a laudable target, but it probably won’t exert the influence on the world stage that Mr Johnson believes.

China provides the clearest example of this cake-and-eat-it doctrine. Mr Johnson, sincerely or not, thinks that he can berate the Chinese government for human rights abuses perpetrated against the Uighur people and in Hong Kong while simultaneously expecting state-controlled Chinese companies to invest billions in Britain’s infrastructure.

The government expects the Chinese authorities to understand why Huawei is being expelled from the 5G rollout but the China General Nuclear Power Group is an honoured partner in energy generation. One moment the politburo in Beijing could face the arrival of a British aircraft carrier in the South China Sea, and the next it could be kindly requested to support the upcoming Cop26 conference’s pace-setting targets to tackle the climate crisis.

Mr Johnson acknowledges that China has “opposing values”, and tries to portray his approach as some sort of middle way. However, if the prime minister wants the Chinese to buy more British goods and to create jobs in Britain, what will that mean for a hardline stance over the treatment of citizens in Hong Kong? Britain is in no position to throw its weight around.

The prime minister says this is the most comprehensive review of foreign, defence and development strategy since the end of the Cold War, which it is, but it is also the most comprehensive disappointment. There was barely any substance on Britain’s relationship with the EU, nor was there even an apology for the abandonment of the commitment to spending 0.7 per cent of national income on overseas development, a weapon of “soft power” unilaterally disarmed – for now at least.

Instead, Britain is to upgrade its nuclear deterrent, which is a leftover from the Cold War. In an age of cyber warfare and asymmetrical threats, it is hard not to think that this particular type of nuclear deterrent feels anachronistic. The commitment of British troops to Estonia suggests that boots on the ground in vulnerable smaller states are a better way of making leaders like Russia’s Vladimir Putin think twice. As things stand, the “strategic” integrated review says nothing about what Britain’s nuclear weapons are actually for, something of an omission.

After the Brexit referendum, many assumed Britain’s foreign policy would be targeted like a precision-guided missile on securing trade deals with the larger more dynamic economies of the world. So far, there’s been little progress and, in the case of China, quite the reverse. Mr Johnson is off to see China’s regional rival, India, next month to see what business might be done. There will, no doubt, be much talk of historic ties – but the prime minister needs more than warm words.

Global Britain needs to accept its new place in the world.