The Middle East is on the cusp of a new era. Reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar could be part of that

It has been almost three years since Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and Bahrain, severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, accusing it of “funding terrorism” and of seeking to destabilise the region.

On Monday, rumours about a failed coup d’etat in Qatar - spread via Twitter - were a reminder that the region may well be able to defeat the coronavirus outbreak, but it will not recover from the plague of disinformation and propaganda anytime soon.

The 2017 boycott on Qatar (or blockade as the Qataris like to call it) was a byproduct of the post-Arab Spring landscape. Its fault lines have been drawn on Qatar’s ideological, economic and political support for Islamist groups (Qatar is clear about backing the Muslim Brotherhood, but has denied aiding militant groups linked to al-Qaeda or Isis) versus authoritarian governments and secular militaries in other parts of the region.

However, the Covid-19 pandemic, President Trump’s handling of it, and the rise of China will likely force the Gulf powers to adapt.

Sources in the Gulf told me that “talks have intensified recently in back channels between Saudi Arabia and Qatar”. They confirmed that “a political solution is looming, and will likely incorporate a halt of the mutual media shelling.”

The UAE is well aware of the recent deliberations, and Emirati officials are being kept informed by their Saudi counterparts on the latest developments in the negotiations.

Qatar and the UAE have been at ideological loggerheads for decades. Recently, medical diplomacy has become the central modus operandi in the two countries’ war of influence. In countries like Yemen, Syria and Libya, fear of the virus and the potential for it to spread quickly has forced the rival powers and their surrogates to go quiet. Now, shipments are more likely to carry face masks than guns and ammunition.

The pain of the coronavirus economic recession is already being felt in many Gulf states. The timing of the nosedive in oil prices, amid a price war between Riyadh and Moscow, has created a serious test for Gulf economies. But it will also create opportunities for change.

For Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, the group long carried the Qatari political objectives around the region, is in tatters. Its friendly armed militias and Sunni groups in every corner of the Middle East are on the backfoot. The historic rise of the Islamist ideology that was part of the Arab Spring in a number of nations is seemingly behind us for now.

No wonder Qatar has been seeking to back central governments. In January, Doha offered Lebanon financial aide to stop economic meltdown. Last month, Qatar sent PPE equipment and other medical supplies to the governments of Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and the Tripoli government in Libya.

Qatari officials have been promoting “stability” as they cultivate influence, especially in North Africa. Ironically, this is the same message the UAE has been pushing to justify supporting the authoritarian regimes of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and Khalifa Haftar in Libya, as well as its recent praise for Bashar al-Assad in Syria. For the UAE, centralised power means stability.

Meanwhile, Gulf leaders, especially in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, are watching Trump’s missteps in dealing with the coronavirus outbreak in awe. Ultimately, a Democrat in the White House would potentially press on with reconciliation in the Gulf, pour cold water on the Saudi hawkish approach towards Iran, and end Trump’s free political ticket given to beleaguered Arab autocrats.

Even if Trump retains his place in the White House this November, those measures would be necessary to impose calm in the Middle East as the US is set to shift its focus back towards Beijing.

It is Saudi Arabia, in the short term, that will have to deal most with a scarcity of foreign investments, economic stagnation and plummeting oil prices. In the long run, the country’s stability will much rely on how smoothly the power transition within the kingdom will pass, the Middle East policies Trump and his successors will implement, and the future trajectory of the Beijing-Washington rivalry.

All said, Saudi Arabia is in a position to accept détente with Qatar. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has repeatedly asserted that the Qatar problem “is very, very, very small.” In September 2017, he received a call from Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, which riled up his tripartite allies.

Although major obstacles are still on the way of a real thaw, the boycott’s failure to bring Qatar to its knees, and the urgent need for reshaping the Gulf monarchies’ future role to adopt the new economic and geopolitical trends, will most likely end the feud.

While Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran will come out of the Covid-19 outbreak badly bruised, the UAE and Qatar will likely continue punching above their weight.

The coronavirus crisis will draw a line with the post-Arab Spring era in the Middle East and start a new one. Rumours of the Qatar’s coup d’etat reveal that many in the Gulf are still hanging on to the past when they should be looking to the future.