In Northern Ireland, compromises can be essential as well as shabby
The IRA still exists, a private army behind the republican politicians helping to run Northern Ireland rather well
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Your support makes all the difference.The history of the Government's handling of the Northern Ireland peace process is steeped in shabby compromises. Nowhere is this truer than in the monitoring of paramilitary ceasefires. When, in the late summer of 1999, Mo Mowlam took one of the most difficult decisions of her time in Belfast, namely that neither the arrest of IRA men for gun running in Florida nor the republican murder of a taxi driver were in breach of the ceasefire, she was flying in the face of the objective realities. Which is why she came under ferocious attack from unionists, and why, in one of the most dramatic breaks with bipartisanship over Northern Ireland yet, the Conservative spokesman, Quentin Davies, made so much of it yesterday.
And yet if she hadn't done as she did, there would have been no political process. Nor would there have been, come to that, if the previous government, in clear breach of its stated principles, had not talked secretly with the IRA at a time when there was no ceasefire at all. A compromise can be essential as well as shabby.
But that was then. Today, two Sinn Fein members are ministers in the devolved government. The party is enjoying a surge of electoral success on both sides of the border on the back of its commitment to the peace process. As a corollary of this new-found – and hugely welcome – integration into the democratic process, mainstream republicanism can expect to be judged by rather higher standards. It shows no sign whatever of wishing to return to war. Indeed, it is hard to overestimate the steep fall in deaths: six this year compared with 100 a mere 10 years ago.
But the IRA still exists, a private army standing behind the smart, articulate republican politicians helping to run Northern Ireland rather well. Some of its representatives were caught red-handed collaborating with Farc narco-terrorists in Colombia. Some 90 or more security personnel have had to be relocated and protected after the theft of documents from the Special Branch HQ at Castlereagh, and although criminal investigations are still under way, it is no secret that the authorities assume the theft was the work of the IRA. Furthermore, some of its representatives are thought to be playing a part in the daily sectarian violence in sections of North and East Belfast. So too, probably on a bigger scale, are loyalist paramilitaries; a Catholic man was brutally murdered this week because he was wearing a Celtic shirt. But then it's Sinn Fein that is in the government.
All of this has contributed to the sense of disillusionment among many unionists about the Good Friday Agreement, and to the urgency with which David Trimble, under chronic pressure from hardliners in his own party, has urged the Government to judge the ceasefire – which is a precondition of Sinn Fein's membership of the devolved institutions – a great deal more rigorously than in the past. Hence the "yellow card" that John Reid, the Northern Ireland Secretary, showed the republicans yesterday.
The first question, of course, is when and how would the offending players get sent off the pitch? If a breach were judged to have taken place, the Government would recommend to the assembly that the offenders be expelled. Because assembly decisions require cross-community support, that would put the burden of the decision, in the first instance, on the nationalist SDLP. The best bet is that the SDLP, facing ever stiffer electoral competition from an increasingly potent Sinn Fein, would be deeply reluctant to forgo its long-held doctrine that the executive should include all parties, whatever the strains. It would not, in other words, go along with it, which would leave it up to the Ulster Unionist First Minister to collapse the executive, as he has done before, by walking out. The British government already has the power to recommend exclusion; the new factor is that – if it holds true to the criteria set out yesterday by Mr Blair and Dr Reid – it will be readier to use that power in the case of clear breaches.
That at least is the theory. But Dr Reid's statement falls short of what Mr Trimble publicly sought. It would almost certainly mean the collapse of the executive if there was a new Colombia or a new Castlereagh. But under such circumstances the Unionists might well walk out anyway. And there was no disguising a strong sense of disappointment among moderate unionists in Belfast yesterday – in particular that there is no promise of an independent and transparent means of auditing the ceasefire.
Which brings us to one of the more interesting points about what happened in the Commons yesterday. The Opposition spokesman, Quentin Davies, asked some pertinent questions. But in an extravagant display of angry rhetoric he savaged the statement in terms that were in the strongest possible contrast to Mr Trimble himself . Indeed, by suddenly moving to the right of Mr Trimble, he invited accusations of undermining the position of the Ulster Unionist leader. Yet Mr Trimble, who simply asked a series of detailed and pointed questions with forensic efficiency, has to worry about the constant threat not only to the peace process but to his own position as leader. Mr Davies has little to worry about except the editorial line of The Daily Telegraph.
Mr Trimble's response is the more interesting. For him this is a matter of much more than point-scoring. His leadership could be at risk in September. He is fed up with he sees as prevarication by the British government in the face of republican misdemeanours. He wanted the statement to go much further. But he also believes in the peace process.
And at the heart of the quest for peace is a painful dilemma. If the hurdles are set too high, devolution – and with it the political process – collapses. If they are set too low, its credibility, particularly among law-abiding unionists, continues to plummet. As an attempt to resolve that dilemma, yesterday's statement is, of course, another compromise.
But it was, if nothing else, a public recognition that the standards by which the paramilitaries are judged are getting progressively higher. It may be that Dr Reid can go a little further over the coming weeks towards meeting Mr Trimble's demand for an independent element in the judgement of ceasefires. But he is not going to abandon his right to decide for himself whether they have been broken. And yes, there is a large element of smoke and mirrors about the statement's provisions. On the other hand, the IRA would be making a grave mistake if it does not listen to the subtext. Which is that the more that Sinn Fein enjoys the fruits of political participation, the more it has to reintegrate in civil society in every other way.
In a climate – especially in the US – much more hostile to the double standards of ex-terrorists, republicans cannot expect even liberal opinion to tolerate them for ever. Gradually, but inexorably, the compromises will start to lose their shabbiness.
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