Brexicon: A full dictionary of Brexit-related jargon

We’ve tried not to be too dry, though necessarily having to reflect some of the arid prose of both London and Brussels’ bureaucracies. We’ve also tried to be unbiased, and to be objective as possible (as in “as frictionless as possible” as ministers often say) but the task is made more difficult because so many feel so emotional about the issue, the facts themselves are often in dispute, and trying to nail any of these definitions is like trying to nail European Commission approved jelly to a European Commission approved wall. This guide does not, as Boris Johnson would say, possess the lapidary status of the codes of Hammurabi or Moses, and makes no claim to do so.

It’s continuing project, and we will add to it as comprehensively as possible (there we go again), and hope you find it useful. We’re also very interested in any new coinages you come across, so please share them via letters@independent.co.uk

Ambitious managed divergence: Arguably oxymoronic phrase adopted by all sides after the Brexit “war cabinet” meeting at Chequers in February 2018. It suggests that any UK divergence from EU Single market rules will be “managed”, suggesting slow and modest change, as the Chancellor, Philip Hammond has recommended; but also that it may in due course also be more rapid and radical, or “ambitious” as figures such as the foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson is assumed to favour. See also Three Baskets; cherry-picking, managed divergence.

ANPR: Automatic Number Plate Recognition. Widespread technology used by modern law enforcement agencies. A possible technological partial answer to the Hard Border issue (qv), especially at the Ireland-Northern Ireland border. See also: Smart Border 2.0; Hard Border; Soft Border.

Article 49: The clause in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) that sets out the procedure for an eligible state to apply for membership of the European Union. Theoretically, it could in due course be used by the UK to rejoin the EU. One day.

Article 50: The clause in Treaty of Lisbon (2009) that sets out the procedure for a member state to leave the European Union. It was composed by senior British diplomat Sir John (now Lord) Kerr. He has said that it is reversible during the notice period; others differ. The clause reads, in full:

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.

Brexchosis: Double portmanteau word invented by the fecund mind of Boris Johnson. In a speech by the Foreign Secretary about the “road to Brexit” on 13 February 2018 he said: “We love to run ourselves down – in fact we are Olympic gold medal winners in the sport of national self-deprecation.

“And in the current bout of Brexchosis we are missing the truth: that it is our collective national job now to ensure that when the history books come to be written Brexit will be seen as just the latest way in which the British bucked the trend, and took the initiative – and did something that responds to the real needs and opportunities that we face in the world today and had the courage to break free from an idea – however noble its origins – that had become outdated, at least for us.”

Brexiety: (1) State of anxiety about Brexit experienced by opponents of Brexit. (2) State of anxiety about Brexit experienced by opponents of Brexit.

Brexit: Portmanteau expression for British exit from the European Union, ironically devised by a pro-European. According to the Oxford English Dictionary it dates back to 15 May 2012, when the OED awarded this honour to Peter Wilding, founder and director of the British Influence think tank, which campaigned for the UK to Remain in the EU in the 2016 referendum, put it in a tweet – “Unless a clear view is pushed that Britain must lead in Europe at the very least to achieve the completion of the single market then the portmanteau for Greek euro exit might be followed by another sad word, Brexit”.

Brexit, bespoke: As in tailoring, a “made to measure” EU deal for the UK that doesn’t copy and paste from other deals such as Norway or Canada, but takes account of the UK’s existing relationship with the EU and future ambitions. In her Lancaster House speech in January 2017 Theresa May stated: ““That is why we seek a new and equal partnership – between an independent, self-governing, Global Britain and our friends and allies in the EU.”

“Not partial membership of the European Union, associate membership of the European Union, or anything that leaves us half-in, half-out. We do not seek to adopt a model already enjoyed by other countries. We do not seek to hold on to bits of membership as we leave.” See also: Ambitious managed divergence; cherry-picking.

Brexit bus: (1) A Neoplan Starliner coach manufactured by a German company in Poland. It was hired by the Leave campaign and painted red during the 2016 EU Referendum Campaign. Registration mark: E14 ACK. Subsequently leased by Greenpeace. (2) Shorthand for “£350m”, from the slogan on the side: “We send the Eu £350 million a week. Let’s fund our NHS instead. Vote Leave” (3) The Blunderbus.

Brexit, clean: Preferred expression/euphemism for hard Brexit favoured by Leavers. Also the title of a book by pro-Brexit economists Liam Halligan and Gerard Lyons.

Brexit Day: The UK is scheduled to leave the EU on Friday, 29 March 2019 (at 11 pm, according to the Prime Minister). If the transition period proposed by the EU is adopted, then the UK will leave the transitional status on 31 December 2020. The final result of the EU referendum was announced on Friday 24 June 2016 at 7.20am by the Electoral Commission chairwoman Jenny Watson at Manchester Town Hall. The then Ukip leader, Nigel Farage, called for 23 June, the referendum polling day, to be declared UK Independence Day (Ukid).

Brexit, Green: The Environment Secretary, Michael Gove’s vision: “Leaving the EU gives us a once in a lifetime opportunity to reform how we manage agriculture and fisheries, and therefore how we care for our land, our rivers and our seas. And we can recast our ambition for our country’s environment, and the planet. In short, it means a Green Brexit.” Speech, 21 July 2017

Brexit, hard: Definitions vary, but converge on the idea that the UK leaves the EU and goes on to trade with it under World Trade Organisation rules, or an agreement based on WTO rules, but also leaving the EU’s customs union and single market. See also Brexit, cliff edge and Brexit, clean.

Brexit, Jobs-first: Jeremy Corbyn’s preferred version of Brexit, though no-one has yet advocated a “jobs-last” Brexit: “The choice is between a jobs-first Labour Brexit and a reckless Tory Brexit, based on a race to the bottom in working conditions and corporate taxes”. Unite event, Basildon June 1st

Brexit means Brexit: Catchphrase Theresa May first uttered when she was Home Secretary and campaigning to become her party leader. In her one and only campaign event before all the other candidates dropped out, at a rally of supporters in Birmingham on 11 July 2016, she stated: “Well, I couldn’t be clearer. Brexit means Brexit. And we’re going to make a success of it. There will be no attempts to remain inside the EU, no attempts to rejoin it by the back door, and no second referendum. The country voted to leave the European Union, and as Prime Minister I will make sure that we leave the European Union.” Two days later she was appointed Prime Minister.

Brexit, red, white and blue: Theresa May’s short-lived refutation of any other “colour” of Brexit. She told reporters during a trip to the Gulf in December 2016: “I’m interested in all these terms that have been identified – hard Brexit, soft Brexit, black Brexit, white Brexit, grey Brexit – and actually what we should be looking for is a red, white and blue Brexit”.

Brexit, soft: Version of leaving the European Union that would mean staying in the EU customs union and/or single market, preferably with a very long or indefinite transition period. See also Brino and Brexit, white.

Brexit, white: A version of Brexit that retains UK membership of the EU customs union and/or single market. See also soft Brexit and Brino.

Brexodus: While more EU citizens come to the UK than the number who leave it, they are now coming in smaller numbers. The ONS found that 52,000 more UK citizens left than came back in the year ending September 2017.

Brexthrough: Reflects sudden progress in UK-EU talks. Only one known use, in the Sun newspaper.

Brino: “Brexit in name only”. Coinage devised by Jacob Rees-Mogg, chair of the European Research Group of Conservative MPs. In an interview in January 2018 he declared: “If everything is delayed for two years and then there’s high alignment you will find that by 2022 no one will have noticed any difference from having left. Then what will be the point of voting for the party that’s implemented it. I’m against ‘Brino’.”

Cake and eat it: Phrase usually taken to mean the UK wanting to retain all the benefits of EU membership but none of burdens. See also cherry-picking, ambitious managed divergence, “a” customs union, Brexit, bespoke.

Cherry-picking; Disparaging term to describe the UK;s wish to agree a “deep and special partnership” (qv) with the EU that suits the UK by taking some elements of the Customs Union and/or Single Market, but not others. See also: “Ambitious managed divergence; Three Baskets; “Cake and eat it”.

Cliff edge: A version of hard Brexit which envisages no “transition” or “implementation” period. Feared by Remainers; embraced by some Leavers. See also clean Brexit.

Common Travel Area: Can be thought of as a mini-Schengen, whereby people may move without passport controls between the UK and Ireland, including at the Ireland-Northern Ireland border. Established in 1923 after Irish independence, it was followed up in 1998 after the Good Friday Agreement by the abolition of border security posts and identification requirements. There are no passport controls for EU or non-EU citizens at the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. However neither the UK nor Ireland are members of the Schengen zone (qv), so fellow EU citizens face checks at Dublin, Dover and so on on the same basis. See also; Smart Border 2.0; Hard Border; Soft Border.

Customs union, “a”: An arrangement whereby the UK can enjoy the benefits of the EU customs union but without full membership of it, theoretically allowing the UK to agree trade deals with other countries. The main precedent is Turkey, which is in a partial customs union with the EU for certain economic sectors – but excludes agriculture, for example. However, Turkey’s ability to conduct separate trade deals with other countries and to set its own terms for trade (tariffs, quotas and rules) are constrained by its partial customs union with the EU. UK membership of “a” customs union with the EU is official Labour Party policy, and favoured by some in the Conservative Party. Three European “micro-states”, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco, are also members of the EU customs union but not full member states of the EU. They operate under onerous conditions in terms of their ability to import goods that then enter the EU proper.

Customs union, “the”: The European Union’s founding principle, set in the Treaty of Rome, 1957, is that it would abolish all tariffs and quotas on trade within its members states, and that therefore all goods can circulate freely within the European Union. The member states would also agree to set a common external tariff and rules on imports for the rest of the world. Thus they set a tax on imports of American cars, and banned American GM food. The forerunner to the EU customs union was the smaller one set up by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg by Treaty in 1944.

Customs partnership with the EU: The UK’s policy, as set out in the 2016 position paper. Defined as follows by David Davis: “Aligning our approach to the customs border in a way that removes the need for a UK-EU customs border. One potential approach would involve the UK mirroring the EU’s requirements for imports from the rest of the world where their final destination is the EU. This is of course unprecedented as an approach and could be challenging to implement and we will look to explore the principles of this with business and the EU.”

Deep and special partnership: What everyone wants. Phrase frequently used by Theresa May and other ministers. For example in a joint article for a German newspaper, Philip Hammond and David Davis wrote: “Of course we understand that Germany and other EU countries want to protect the integrity of the single market, and that without all the obligations of EU membership third countries cannot have all the benefits. Those priorities are not inconsistent with ours — a deep and special partnership with our closest trading partners and allies.”

European Communities Act (1972): “An Act to make provision in connection with the enlargement of the European Communities to include the United Kingdom, together with (for certain purposes) the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and Gibraltar.” It gave legal effect to the UK signing the Treaty of Rome. It received Royal Asset on 17 October 1972, and became effective on 1 January 1973. It is short, but had the effect of incorporating a large body of current and present European law into UK law (the aquis communautaire”). See also; Great Repeal Bill; European Communities.

European Economic Area: Comprises the European Union nations plus three of the four members of the European Free Trade Area. IN mathematical terms, then: EEA = EU + (EFTA – Switzerland). Switzerland does, however, have a series of bilateral agreements covering aspects of the Single Market, and can thus be said to be partially in it. It is legally overseen by the Efta Court (Efta members) and the EU European Court (EU members). Disputes between the EU or EU member states and Efta/Efta states are decided by the EEA Joint Committee. The EEA Joint Committee comprises the 31 member states of the bloc (28 EU plus three Efta), plus the European Commission.

Currently membership of the EEA is open to EU or Efta members only, so, in principle, the UK would need to re-join Efta in order to qualify. This would, however, make the Efta rather imbalanced with such a large economy attached.

European Free Trade Area: Set up in 1960 under, in effect, British leadership offering an alternative model of European economic co-operation and free trade, but without the political or federalist ambitions of the EU “Six” of the time to build “an ever closer union”. Originally “The Seven” were: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Iceland joined in 1970, Finland in 1986, ad Liechtenstein in 1991. In defecting to the EU, the UK and Denmark left in 1973; Portugal in 1986; Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995. Three of the four remaining Efta states (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein are members of the Single Market and the European Economic Area. Switzerland has bilateral treaties covering certain economic sectors.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill; See Great Repeal Bill

Five tests: These were set out by Theresa May in her Mansion House speech on March 2^nd. They are designed to help deliver on her pledge to “make Britain a country that works for everyone”. In full, they are:

“First, the agreement we reach with the EU must respect the referendum. It was a vote to take control of our borders, laws and money. And a vote for wider change, so that no community in Britain would ever be left behind again. But it was not a vote for a distant relationship with our neighbours.

Second, the new agreement we reach with the EU must endure. After Brexit both the UK and the EU want to forge ahead with building a better future for our people, not find ourselves back at the negotiating table because things have broken down.

Third, it must protect people’s jobs and security. People in the UK voted for our country to have a new and different relationship with Europe, but while the means may change our shared goals surely have not – to work together to grow our economies and keep our people safe.

Fourth, it must be consistent with the kind of country we want to be as we leave: a modern, open, outward-looking, tolerant, European democracy. A nation of pioneers, innovators, explorers and creators. A country that celebrates our history and diversity, confident of our place in the world; that meets its obligations to our near neighbours and far off friends, and is proud to stand up for its values.

And fifth, in doing all of these things, it must strengthen our union of nations and our union of people.”

Four freedoms, the: The free movement of goods, services, capital and persons within the EU were first set out in the Rome. They were extended and made more practical under the single market, also known as the internal market, mostly completed in 1992. The four freedoms were further strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty. According to the EU itself: “Originally, free movement of goods was seen as part of a customs union between the member states, involving the abolition of customs duties, quantitative restrictions on trade and equivalent measures, and the establishment of a common external tariff for the Community. Later, the emphasis was laid on eliminating all remaining obstacles to free movement of goods with a view to creating the internal market – an area without internal borders, in which goods could move as freely as on a national market.”

Free trade agreement: An EU-UK free trade agreement is UK government policy and is feasible. It would mean a free trade area across the existing EU28 (and any new members), whereby there would be no tariffs or taxes or quotas on goods or services from one country entering another. The problem is that it is not the same as a single market or customs union, and would require some form of border checks or controls or other arrangements. This is because it could be very easy for, say, China to export steel to the UK and then for that steel to bypass EU tariffs by freely going straight into the rest of the EU. Therefore trade would be subject to “friction” and cost, and would mean, possibly, some form of hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, as well as at the airports, Channel ports and other doorways. See also streamlined customs arrangement.

Negotiations typically cover goods rather than services, and take many years to conclude, as with the recent deals between the EU and Canada. On the other hand the UK starts from a position of high integration and free trade rather than with barriers in place. The EU has expressed its dissatisfaction with a free trade deal encompassing three of the four freedoms, excluding the right of labour to move around the area.

Frictionless trade/Frictionless border: True “frictionless” trade can only be achieved within a customs union and single market, but even in such cases, as in the USA or the EU, inter-state trade can be restricted by different local rules.In the EU, some national rules, espcially in services, still inhibit trade, as do the existence of different currencies in the UK, Sweden and Poland, for example. For Brexit, the British government and the EU have recognised that “frictionless” trade cannot be achieved in full after the UK leaves the EU, and the phrase “as frictionless as possible” is now favoured. This will mark a change from the status quo between the UK and the rest of the EU, within the Single Market and the Customs Union (though the UK never had membership of the eurozone or the Schengen Agreement would have made trade even easier). “Trade as frictionless as possible” is the formulation used by British minsters to mean the lowest level of customs controls, tariffs, quotas and restrictions as can be negotiated. These could still be significant, and cannot be more friction-free than the current arrangement. See also Soft Border; Hard Border.

Great Repeal Bill: (1) Reverse the effects of the European Communities Act (1972) (qv) and subsequent measures. (2) Essentially an administrate exercise that transfers EU law into English law in time for Brexit, so avoiding chaos. (3) A power grab by the executive at the expense of parliament with inadequate scrutiny of ministerial decisions.

Hard Border: All (almost) agree that there should be no hard border with substantial physical infrastructure between Ireland and Northern Ireland. All have failed to find an answer to the conundrum of how the UK can be outside the EU Customs Union (and Ireland still in it) without some checks at the border about goods entering and leaving the two entities, and to ascertain, for example, if “rules of origin” (qv) are being observed.

The British governemtn has suggested “streamlined” customs arrangements (qv) using number plate recognition cameras, “trusted trader” schemes (qv) and apps could solve many of the problems.

In her Mansion House speech in March 2018, Theresa May repeated her commitment to “highly streamlined customs arrangements”:

“First, measures to ensure the requirements for moving goods across borders are as simple as possible.

This means we should continue to waive the requirement for entry and exit declarations for goods moving between the UK and the EU. And we should allow goods moving between the UK and the rest of the world to travel through the EU without paying EU duties and vice versa.

Second, measures to reduce the risk of delays at ports and airports. For example, recognising each other’s “trusted traders” schemes and drawing on the most advanced IT solutions so that vehicles do not need to stop at the border.

Third, we should continue our cooperation to mitigate customs duty and security risks. And fourth, measures to reduce the cost and burden of complying with customs administrative requirements, including by maximising the use of automation”.

In the specific case of the Ireland-Northern Ireland border, she added:

“80% of North-South trade is carried out by micro, small and medium sized businesses. So for smaller traders – who as members of the community are most affected but whose economic role is not systemically significant for the EU market – we would allow them to continue to operate as they do currently, with no new restrictions.

And for larger traders we would introduce streamlined processes, including a trusted trader scheme that would be consistent with our commitments.”

The Irish government has consistently made clear its desire to have the UK “no hard border” commitment enshrined in a legal document.

In a leaked letter to the Prime Minister, in February 2018, the Foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, apparently entertained the notion of some border checks, if only as a contingency: “even if a hard border is reintroduced” in Ireland, it would not significantly affect trade across the UK’s land border with the EU”, in an apparent reversal of his previous position.

Hard Brexit: See Brexit, hard.

Internal market: See single market.

Inverted power: A new role, or power, for Westminster to judge whether powers brought “home” from Brussels and the EUL should be devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It was laid out in a speech by Cabinet minister David Lidington as part of the “Road to Brexit” (qv) speeches.

Mr Lidington stated: “So our proposal is to amend the bill before parliament to make clear that while frameworks are being agreed, the presumption would now be that powers returning from the EU should sit at a devolved level.

Westminster would only be involved where, to protect the UK common market or to meet our international obligations, we needed a pause – I stress pause – to give the governments time to design and put in place a UK-wide framework.

As I have said before, we expect to be able to secure agreement with the devolved governments about what frameworks should – or should not – apply to each power.

And where powers do need to be returned to a UK-wide framework, we will maintain the ability for the UK parliament to legislate to do so.

Just as the current provisions within the EU withdrawal bill on releasing powers to devolved governments are intended to be by consensus and agreement with the devolved governments themselves, so we should expect this new, inverted power to operate in the same way – by consensus and by agreement.”

Legal entity: The EU exists as an international legal entity in its own right. This is the legal underpinning to the EU negotiating with the UK on Brexit as a bloc rather than through individual states. The conferral of legal personality on the EU means that it has the ability to:

Conclude and negotiate international agreements in accordance with its external commitments;

Become a member of international organisations;

Join international conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights.

Mad Max-style dystopia: (1) What Brexit isn’t, according to the Secretary of state foe Exiting the European Union, David Davis. (2) What Brexit is, according to its critics, having been offered the vivid description by the Secretary of State.

Mr Davis declared in a speech in Austria on February 20th: “They fear that Brexit could lead to an Anglo-Saxon race to the bottom. With Britain plunged into a Mad Max style world borrowed from dystopian fiction. These fears about a race to the bottom are based on nothing, not our history, not our intentions, nor our national interest. Frankly, the competitive challenge we in the UK and the European Union will face from the rest of the world — where 90 per cent of growth in markets will come from — will not be met by a reduction in standards. We will never be cheaper than China, or have more resources than Brazil.”

Managed divergence: (1) Process whereby the UK sets its own rules and regulations, but also maintains those standards to a similar or higher standard to their EU equivalents, either permanently or temporarily, pending regulatory divergence (qv). (2) Cherry picking. See also Three Baskets; Brexit, Soft; Regulatory divergence, Regulatory equivalence, vassal state etc

Member states: Formal description of the countries that form the EU. The original “Six” of 1957 have been joined by 22 more. Since 1 July 2013, when Croatia joined the EU, the European Union counts 28 Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (until Brexit).

All member states are in the single market; but some non-EU states are as well (eg Norway), or partially in the single market (Switzerland).

All member states are in the customs union; but some non-EU states are partially as well (eg Turkey).

Not all member states are in the border, visa and passport-free Schengen Area: the UK and Ireland and Cyprus are not. And one non-EU state is in the Schengen Area – Switzerland.

Some EU states are members of the eurozone, others have agreed to join and others have opt-outs.

Most favoured nation, most favoured nation treatment (MFN): Confusing expression for the World Trade organisation rule that means countries cannot normally discriminate between trading partners, except in certain specified circumstances. In the words of the WTO itself: “Grant someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members”.

“This principle is known as most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment (see box). It is so important that it is the first article of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which governs trade in goods. MFN is also a priority in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Article 2) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Article 4), although in each agreement the principle is handled slightly differently. Together, those three agreements cover all three main areas of trade handled by the WTO”.

“Some exceptions are allowed. For example, countries can set up a free trade agreement that applies only to goods traded within the group — discriminating against goods from outside. Or they can give developing countries special access to their markets. Or a country can raise barriers against products that are considered to be traded unfairly from specific countries. And in services, countries are allowed, in limited circumstances, to discriminate. But the agreements only permit these exceptions under strict conditions. In general, MFN means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or services from all its trading partners — whether rich or poor, weak or strong.”

Thus, under Brexit, if the UK were to, say, abolish tariffs and quotas for cereal imports for the US, it would have to do the same for, say, the EU and Canada (which may not suit the US side of the negotiations). If Britain set no tariffs on car imports from the US, it would be obliged to do the same for Japan, China, India and Mexico, say. Also, British exports to the EU and other WTO members would also be subject to the various importing countries’ or blocs’ most favoured nation tariffs.

Opt-outs: Negotiated by individual states as a way of protecting vital national interests when further integration is proposed. They are examples of how individual nations can be allowed to opt out of obligations they find irksome; but are also difficult and sometimes costly to secure, and are not retrospective, as with some Eastern European countries who wish to restrict freedom of movement of people. The most celebrated in the UK is the exemption of sterling form the eurozone, but there are other exemptions below:

Schengen Agreement: Ireland and the United Kingdom;

Economic and monetary union (the euro): Denmark and the United Kingdom;

Defence: Denmark;

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Poland and the United Kingdom;

Security and justice: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (the latter two countries may opt into given initiatives if they wish).

Thus there are some areas where Brexit will mean no difference to the UK’s relations with the EU27. John Major’s government negotiated a UK opt-out from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, subsequently irrevocably reversed by the Blair government in 1997. David Cameron’s attempted renegotiation of the UK’s terms of membership in 2015 to 216 could be seen as a failed bid to widen the UK’s right to win opt-outs; and Brexit as an even more ambitious attempt to “cherrypick” EU rights and obligations.

Qualified majority voting (QMV): In effect the loss of the historic right of the UK and other member states to veto EU Commission proposals they don’t like. This was begun in the 1980s and has been extended to a number of important areas, thus diminishing national sovereignty and the power of national parliaments to block new laws. However the veto and unanimity still prevail in some crucial votes.

The QMV rules have become steadily more complicated, with more and more member states and the need to balance the rights of large powers (eg Germany, population 83 million) and smaller countries (eg Malta, population 437,000, the same as Cardiff). According to the EU: Qualified majority (QM) is the number of votes required in the Council for a decision to be adopted when issues are being debated on the basis of Article 16 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 238 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Under the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council acts by QM, in co-decision with the Parliament.

On 1 November 2014, a new procedure for QM voting, the “double majority” rule, was introduced. Here, when the Council votes on a proposal by the Commission or the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a QM is reached if two conditions are met:

• 55 per cent of EU countries vote in favour – ie 16 out of 28;

• The proposal is supported by countries representing at least 65 per cent of the total EU population.

When the Council votes on a proposal not made by the Commission or the High Representative, a decision is adopted if:

• There are 72 per cent of EU country votes in favour; and

• They represent at least 65 per cent of the EU population.

QMV may be seen as a crude form of federal voting in the multi-state EU.

Regulatory alignment: Commonly taken to mean retention of many of the common rules and mutually agreed regulations that currently exist across the EU, including the UK, which would be “copy and pasted” after Brexit. The greater the degree of regulatory alignment the more likely it is that the UK would qualify to be a member of the single market in certain areas.

Regulatory equivalence: Where the UK decides to adopt rules and regulations which are different in their detail or wording to their EU counterparts, but which have much the same effect in practice. The greater the degree of regulatory equivalence, the more likely it is that the UK would qualify to be member of the single market in certain areas.

Regulatory divergence: Where the UK decides to enact its own rules and regulations on everything from workers’ rights and taxation to animal welfare and safety standards for cars. Parliament may or may not choose to follow EU practice, or amend it with a view to national needs and/or the requirements of trade agreements with other countries.

Regrexit: Regretting the decision to vote for Brexit. First used the day after the 2016 referendum.

Schengen Area/Schengen Zone: An agreement signed between some (not all) EU member states and some non-EU states to set up a “common travel area”, whereby all visas, border crossing controls and passport checks were abolished. Named after a small village in Luxembourg and inaugurated in 1985, with many countries joining since then. As a travel and transit arrangement it does not denote the right to settle or work or claim benefits, and is not the same as the freedom of movement of labour (or goods and services).

Single market: Now the usual expression for the former Common Market and internal market. A British idea embodied in the 1986 Single European Act and implemented across the EU in the “1992 Project”, mostly completed in that year and consolidated in the Maastricht Treaty. It aimed to make real the 1957 Treaty of Rome ambition of enshrining the “four freedoms”, which were not fully in place by the 1980s.

It extended the EU’s Common Market in goods and services and free movement of labour by abolishing non-formal and non-tariff restrictions. This meant, for example, that a Greek dentist’s qualifications would be recognised in, say, Ireland, and that national rules in areas such as food safety or the capital adequacy and regulation of banks, for example, would be mutually respected or harmonised across the EU. All EU member states must be members of the single market, and agree to rulings made on it by the European Union Court of Justice, but some countries have chosen to join the single market and abide by the rules set by the EU and the EU Commission, but not be full members of the EU and therefore without any formal say in the formulation of EU rules and laws on the single market.

Thus, Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland are members of the EU single market but not members of the EU; so-called “rule takers not rule makers” or “vassal states”. Together with the EU’s member states they comprise the European Economic Area, wider than the European Union itself. It is not essential to be a member of the EU customs union to join the single market, and Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland can therefore enter into trade agreements with other countries without formal reference to the EU.

Single market, access to: Commonly agreed by everyone, but subject to very different interpretations. (1) All countries have “access” to the EU single market if they are not covered by EU sanctions or a self-imposed exclusion (eg North Korea). (2) Some countries have arranged for partial access to the single market in certain economic sectors. Switzerland is the main example, where it has a series of bilateral agreements covering, among other things: free movement of people; air traffic; road traffic; agriculture; technical trade barriers; public procurement and science.

However these various agreements are subject to periodic revisions and negotiations to take into account changes in EU law, and are regarded by the EU Commission as irksome, and not necessarily a favoured model for the UK in future. Some believe that could serve as a model for UK “access to” the EU single market. However, the EU-Swiss agreements do not cover financial services, where Swiss banks use London as their main entrée into the EU.

By contrast, Switzerland is also a member of the EU Schengen Agreement, which removes all passport controls on the movement of people from and to the European Union.

Smart Border 2.0: Paper by the European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, by customs expert Lars Karlsson. Published in November 2017, it is the most worked out proposal for: “Avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland for Customs control and the free movement of persons”. In summary it proposes a minimum of intrusion – but there will still be more controls than at present: “It is possible to implement a Customs and Border solution that meets the requirements of the EU Customs legislation (Union Customs Code) and procedures, with expected post-Brexit volumes of cross-border people and goods, if using a combination of international standards, global best practices and state-of-the-art technology upgraded to a Smart Border 2.0 or similar solution.”

The Smart Border 2.0 comprises:

“Free Movement of persons under CTA:

Free movement lanes at major border crossings for eligible people covered under CTA;

Use of ANPR at manned and unmanned border crossings;

Requirement for people not eligible under CTA to present at a manned border crossing;

One check: at jurisdiction of entry;

Creation of a frequent travellers program for people not eligible under the CTA;

Legal basis for collaboration and data exchange between Ireland and Northern Ireland/UK.

Create a low-friction border for the movement of goods by:

A bilateral EU-UK agreement regulating an advanced Customs cooperation that avoids duplication and where UK and Irish Customs can undertake inspections on behalf of each other;

Mutual recognition of Authorized Economic Operators (AEO);

A Customs-to-Customs technical agreement on exchange of risk data;

Pre-registration of operators (AEO) and people (Commercial Travellers programme in combination with a Certified Taxable Person programme);

Identification system by the border;

A Single Window with one-stop-shop-elements;

A Unique Consignment reference number (UCR);

A simplified Customs declaration system (100% electronic) with re-use of export data for imports; Mobile Control and Inspection Units;

Technical surveillance of border (CCTV, ANPR etc).

In full here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596828/IPOL_STU(2017)596828_EN.pdf

See also: Soft Border; Hard Border; Customs Unions; Streamlined Customs arrangements; Authorised Economic Operator; Common Travel Area.

Soft border: Covers a range of possibilities form the current borders of Schengen area EU nations, where all border formalities have been dispensed with, to borders between the EU and surrounding countries where most, to varying degrees, have ben dispensed with, for example on the Turkey-Bulgaria/Greece borders, the Swiss-French/German/Italian borders and Norway/Sweden. The exact arrangements depending on whether the peripheral states are (in whole or part) members of the EU Customs Union and/or the EU single Market and/or the Schengen zone (qv). See also Frictionless Border.

Soft Brexit: See Brexit, soft.

Streamlined customs arrangements: The favoured approach of the UK Government as set out in the 2016 policy position paper. It means: “leaving as few additional requirements on EU trade as possible. This would aim to: continue some of the existing arrangements between the UK and the EU; put in place new negotiated and potentially unilateral facilitations to reduce and remove barriers to trade; and implement technology-based solutions to make it easier to comply with customs procedures.

This approach involves utilising the UK’s existing tried and trusted third-country processes for UK-EU trade, building on EU and international precedents, and developing new innovative facilitations to deliver as frictionless a customs border as possible.”

Tariff-free access to the EU: See customs union, “a”

Three Baskets: The options Theresa may would like her Cabinet, the British people and the EU to consider as three main options for Brexit. They help to codify and illustrate the degrees of “regulatory divergence” or “alignment” after the UK leaves the EU; and thus the degree to which it might be part of the Single Market in particular.

The first basket contains areas where Britain wants to achieve the same regulatory standards as the EU through the same means – “regulatory alignment” (qv);

The second are areas where the UK wants similar outcomes but want to adopt different rules and regulations to achieve them – “regulatory equivalence” (qv);

The third basket has the sectors where the UK wants to compete with the EU and adopt a different approach to rules and regulations – “regulatory divergence” (qv). I tis suggested futuristic technologies such as robotics artificial intelligence may fall into this final basket.

Of course it is possible that each minster, basket weaving so to speak, could come up with their own mixture of baskets. There is no guarantee that even if the British government and Parliament is united on the baskets the EU will agree to them. Some in the EU have dismissed the idea as fit only for the waste basket”.

Trusted trader: More properly “Authorised Economic Operator” (qv). For larger companies operating complex supply chains across borders, this is designed to allow them to pre-declare cargoes for the purposes of customs, and in particular to abide by “rules of origin”, so that the UK/EU is not used as a “back door” into the other market to evade agreed regulations. See also Hard Border; Soft Border; Streamline Customs Arrangements.

Unanimity: Commonly thought to have been abandoned entirely by the EU, and the UK’s veto with it in the extension of qualified majority voting. While much of the national power of veto was indeed ended by the introduction of the single market, by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and by the dilution caused by enlargement in the 2000s, unanimity in the Council of Ministers from each member state is still compulsory in certain areas, and the UK still retained its formal right to prevent further integration or harmonisation in certain areas, namely: taxation; social security or social protection; the accession of new countries to the EU; foreign and common defence policy; and operational police cooperation between EU countries.

Vassal state: A nation that is in effect a colony but which retains most of the trappings of its own sovereignty. In the context of Brexit it means agreeing to EU rules and regulations in order to stay in the Single Market, and also the jurisdiction, if full or part, of the European Court, but with no say in EU decision-making, either during a transition period or permanently. Also referred to as “Rule taking, not rule making” and the “Norway model”. Phrase often associated with Jacob Rees-Mogg. See also European Economic Area, Three Baskets, Brexit, Soft.

Veto: See unanimity

War Cabinet: See Cabinet Brexit sub-Committees

Withdrawal clause: See Article 50.