Bombs are still dropping – but the ceasefire deal in Gaza will go ahead
...but while Donald Trump is already positioning himself as the great peacemaker, the chaos is far from over – not least if Netanyahu’s government falls, writes Mary Dejevsky
In one particular respect, the last days of the Biden presidency are starting to look a lot like the last nail-biting days of the Carter Administration, despite – it would appear – the best efforts of the incoming and outgoing US teams to avoid this. In 1981, it was Iran’s Islamic Revolution leaders who wanted to deny the outgoing president any kudos that might accrue from the release of the US embassy hostages held in Tehran. In 2025, the culprit looks more like fate, and the multiplicity of conflicting interests and moving parts.
Five days before the inauguration of Donald Trump, President Biden was able to announce the conclusion of the long-awaited agreement between Israel and Hamas on a ceasefire in Gaza and the release of the remaining Israeli and other hostages held by Hamas since its attacks of 7 October 2023. He opened his farewell address from the Oval Office by claiming credit for the agreement, albeit with a nod to the participation of the Trump team as a guarantee of continuity – the latter had a rather different take on where credit lay. Now, though, less than 24 hours after the announcement, the question of credit may be only theoretical, amid signs that the wheels could be coming off the agreement before it has even come into force.
The three-day gap between the announcement and the agreement coming into effect was always going to present difficulties, as it effectively invites both sides to try to maximise their positions in the remaining hours. So it was that Israel accused Hamas of violations, and continued to strike parts of Gaza.
No less important is the question of a mandate. Autocracies of whatever variety will invariably be simpler to deal with than democracies. Having made an agreement, Hamas leaders can probably enforce it, more or less. Israel’s prime minister needs approval from his fractious cabinet. Given that Benjamin Netanyahu himself was seen as the chief stumbling block to an agreement before now, that might seem a formality.
But that reckons without those further to the right in his cabinet who are effectively keeping his government in power. That the crucial meeting, scheduled for Thursday morning, was delayed did not augur well. Nor did the reported sticking point: a demand from that right faction that the second stage of the three-stage agreement – the start of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza – should, in practice, not be observed, allowing hostilities to recommence. All staged agreements, it might be observed, have this weakness, that compliance may be disputed, so thwarting advance to the next stage. But that is jumping ahead.
For the moment, what is needed is the green light from the Israeli government, without which two things could happen. First, the ceasefire and the staged hostage releases, would not even begin before the end of Biden’s presidency, leaving him without pretty much the only redeeming feature of an otherwise negative record in foreign policy, and any credit for an end to the conflict being left to Trump. (It might be added in passing that with feelers already being extended to North Korea, an early summit with Russia’s president Putin on the cards and a concerted effort to end the Ukraine war in his sights, Trump seems to be eyeing the peacemaker mantle almost before he has begun.)
Second, there is the risk that Netanyahu’s government could fall. It has teetered on the brink many times since 7 October 2023 including in the immediate aftermath when the scale of Israel’s intelligence failure became clear. Yet there was always the argument that Israel with even a just-about functioning government was more likely to prevail over Hamas and recover its hostages than an Israel without such a government, which is why it never actually collapsed.
There was the further argument that Netanyahu, on whose watch 7 October had happened, felt a responsibility to direct Israel’s response. Netanyahu’s personal interests were also said to be a factor in his determination to stay in power, given that further corruption prosecutions could follow his loss of prime ministerial immunity.
This time, though, the government could fall, not just because of opposition in the cabinet to the terms of the negotiated agreement, but because of opposition on the streets if the government fails to endorse what could be the last chance to secure the hostages’ release. That the cabinet and the public would then be pulling in opposite directions, even more than they already are, would only exacerbate the political turmoil in Israel for as long as it takes to hold new elections and for the leading party to form a new coalition.
It hardly needs to be said that the start of a new US presidency of a rather different complexion from that of its predecessor would not be a good time for Israel to be without a functioning government. New uncertainties in the neighbourhood – from the future of Syria through its weakness and possible change in Iran to what will happen to the thousands of jihadi prisoners currently in Kurdish custody – have the potential to make matters worse.
However, a good deal more realism should be applied to the likely importance of the Israel-Hamas agreement, rushed through in the dying days of the Biden presidency, than is currently the case. And this is not a matter of any ceasefire violations that might occur after Sunday: ceasefires have a tendency to take time to bed in, so a few early breaches do not, of themselves, spell failure. Rather, the question that needs to be asked is how much difference this agreement will actually make, even if it comes into force on time and is more or less observed.
In human terms, of course, it would be positive for everyone, and for many that will be enough. The way will be open for the surviving hostages to come home; people will know the fate of their relatives and friends. Many more Palestinian families will be reunited as their prisoners are released.
Masses more aid will be allowed into Gaza and erstwhile residents may be able to return and rebuild, although the scale of that task will be colossal and Gulf money alone, even if forthcoming, will surely not suffice. With the EU looking ahead to rebuilding Ukraine, help from those quarters will be limited. A halt to the hostilities has to be welcome, even if it comes months later than it could have done, and even if, as it appears, the conflict was already to a considerable extent winding down – not least because there was little left in Gaza to destroy.
Even if the three stages are punctiliously adhered to (the chances of which look slim), it has also to be acknowledged that the scope of the agreement is limited and will leave much largely unchanged in regional and geopolitical terms. There is still the matter of the expanding Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank to be addressed; the future administration of Gaza (including the reality that Hamas, as an entity, has not been destroyed), and the lack of Palestinian unity, as between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, which lessens their political weight – although this could change.
The agreement concerns just a small piece of a much bigger regional picture that includes Syria, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, the Kurds, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. All these have been touched in more (Syria) or less (Egypt) dramatic ways by the fall-out from the events of 7 October 2003 and Israel’s response.
Will Donald Trump have the will or the interest to return to what he saw as a beginning with the Abraham Accords, which provided for wider regional recognition of Israel? In essence, the Israel-Hamas agreement looks more like an attempt to end a chapter than start a new one. It also reflects a tiny fraction of the hopes that Biden reputedly nurtured in the wake of 7 October to the effect that the crisis offered a chance to forge a comprehensive Middle East peace. Now, the laurels for such a settlement, if there is to be one, could wreathe the successor whose return to the White House Joe Biden so badly wanted to prevent.
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