Algeria’s revolution is in full swing – but an obsession with the historical defeat of French colonisers has put it under threat

Anyone still searching for the idealistic spirit of the Arab Spring can find it in abundance in Algeria. The largest country in Africa is imbued with democratic intent, and ongoing protests aimed at trying to ensure a more just society remain peaceful.

The millions massing on the streets of major cities such as Algiers and Oran, and indeed in towns and villages, won a hugely impressive victory on 2 April this year, when president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the personification of the country’s old order, finally resigned after two decades in power.

It marked an initial high point in the so-called Revolution of Smiles – an attempt to emulate 2011, when new technology, and especially the internet, was used to mobilise huge swathes of the Arab world against autocratic rulers. Youthful exuberance replaced abject cynicism, as the Arab Spring raised aspirations that profound change really was possible without bloodshed.

That period of history – one that was played out in the international media – largely passed Algeria by, but Bouteflika’s removal is the clearest sign yet that the country is now on the right course. By the time he stepped down, Bouteflika was 82 and in extremely poor health. In reality, he was the figurehead of le pouvoir – the “power” – in a country that is, quite naturally, always in fear of disorder, because its recent history has been dominated by intense violence.

Bouteflika was a teenager when he joined the National Liberation Army that eventually defeated French colonisers in 1962. There is no doubt that he was severely brutalised by the conflict, and his use of military might was maintained throughout a decade-long civil war that he finally brought to an end in 2002. A state of emergency continued until 2011, while an all-powerful army and police state remain as the key power players in Algeria up until today.

It is le pouvoir that the Algerian revolutionaries are challenging. Members of this hyper-controlling executive clique not only claim that they alone can guarantee stability, but they also gain most from an oil and gas-rich economy with enormous potential for growth. A dismal form of cronyism has prevented wealth from trickling down to the masses, instead mainly benefiting the hugely privileged elite.

In turn, men like Bouteflika have successfully cultivated the myth of an ongoing national struggle that dates back to the war of independence. Le pouvoir’s principal lieutenants have a direct link with the fighters who defeated the French, it is argued, and so to reject them is to be unpatriotic, and even traitorous.

General Ahmed Gaid Salah, the military leader currently tasked with quelling street demonstrations across Algeria, certainly accepts this logic. He equates his “heroic” troops with the National Liberation Army of the 1950s and 1960s, as do many older Algerians.

It is this nostalgic reliance on militarism, and indeed a police state, that the revolutionaries need to address, especially as Gaid Salah is stepping up repressive measures in support of Algeria’s interim president, Abdelkader Bensalah.

Dissenters including politicians and business people are being locked up without trial, as part of an “anti-corruption” drive aimed at achieving “national unity”. Among those arrested were former prime ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelmalek Sellal.

Military-backed attempts at a counter-revolution have also included trying to force early elections that could easily be rigged, as many suspect they have been for decades. It is the demonstrators who managed to stop a presidential election scheduled for 4 July, arguing that a transition period was necessary.

The Hirak Sha’bi popular uprising began in mid-February, just after Bouteflika had pledged to stand for a fifth term, and there were fears that le pouvoir would simply get another Bouteflika in place as quickly as possible. Instead, the people spoke up – first of all at football matches, where chanting challenged the government and its enablers.

Algerians are, if nothing else, supremely proud of their country, yet there is absolutely no reason for this patriotism to be channelled into an outdated social order. One can be extremely grateful to a generation that won freedom from France, and that dealt with the chaos that followed 132 years of imperial repression, but this legacy does not need to define modern Algeria.

When the Algeria national football team won the Africa Cup of Nations in July, there was a mass outpouring of a different kind of nationalism – one based on every type of Algerian uniting in a shared triumph. It is these self-same citizens – from doctors and lawyers to students and the unemployed – who are still taking part in weekly protests.

Their low-key revolution is as vibrant as ever, and cannot be crushed by a lumbering system that tries to reduce everybody to a state lackey – one compliant to rulers with no interest in any kind of change, and backed up by ruthless enforcers. The job of the smiling revolutionaries is to reject Algeria’s reliance on militarism, and to demand institutional reforms that will finally open up the country to true democracy.