A nasty surprise awaits Reynolds

The divergence in political objectives of the Dublin and London governments is becoming stark. After the Chequers 'summit' on Monday between John Major and Albert Reynolds, it showed in the priority to be accorded to the disarmament of the paramilitaries. Mr Major wants the surrender of weapons to start soon. Mr Reynolds is in no hurry. As he put it: 'Both of us agree now we have the guns silent. It is important that arrangements have to be made for their destruction at the end of the day.'

There is an interesting and ominous similarity between the formula used by the Taoiseach after Chequers and the formula used by the Vice-President of Sinn Fein, Martin McGuinness, the previous weekend. Mr McGuinness had said that the surrender of arms by the IRA cannot be discussed until the 'end of the road'.

Both he and Gerry Adams have made clear many times exactly what they mean by 'the end of the road'. They mean Brits out, no more United Kingdom, no more Northern Ireland. Mr Reynolds's 'end of the day' formula signals that the IRA will be under no pressure from Dublin to hand in its arms in advance of its own schedule. Of course, if the IRA won't start disarming, neither will the loyalist paramilitaries.

The top priority with Mr Major is the disarming of the paramilitaries, and the conversion of the uneasy truce into a real and stable peace. Mr Reynolds's top priority is that progress be seen to be made in the direction of a united Ireland. This keeps Sinn Fein-IRA happy, and Sinn Fein-IRA are at present Mr Reynolds's closest allies in Irish politics; much closer than his detested partners in the present unhappy coalition of convenience, Dick Spring's Labour Party.

The formula that Mr Reynolds is trying to sell to Mr Major is 'cross- border institutions with executive powers' (CIEP). Mr Reynolds claims that CIEP is quite different from 'joint authority' (of Dublin and London over Northern Ireland). He is not looking for joint authority, he claims, because this would alarm the Unionists. The reality is that he has failed to sell joint authority to the British Government (which has reason to be really concerned about what might alarm the Unionists). CIEP represents the nearest thing to joint authority that might just be sold to the British, and would be perceived by Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein-IRA as a small but significant step in the direction of a united Ireland.

For the moment, Mr Major is not buying even CIEP. From that point of view the Chequers summit represented a rebuff for Mr Reynolds, although this is being concealed from a not-particularly-inquisitive Irish public by the Fianna Fail spin doctors.

Mr Reynolds, with Mr Major's uneasy acquiescence, speaks enthusiastically about 'building on' the dual ceasefire. A more unpromising foundation on which to build anything would be hard to find. The IRA 'cessation of military operations' rests, as Sinn Fein have repeatedly confirmed, on 'rapid progress' towards the IRA's political objectives, which include the liquidation of Northern Ireland.

The loyalist ceasefire, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that 'the Union is safe', by which of course is meant the integrity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Mr Reynolds's idea of building on the dual ceasefire (by CIEP or whatever) means confirming the assumption on which the IRA ceasefire is based, while undermining the assumption on which the loyalist ceasefire is based.

Both assumptions cannot possibly co-exist for long. For the present, however, there are signs of movement towards a temporary and unholy alliance between the two hostile sets of paramilitaries, something like a miniature version of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. The general idea - being discussed in Belfast this week - is that it would suit both sides to get the RUC off the streets. The RUC, since it has tried to enforce the law even-handedly, has inevitably incurred the displeasure of both sets of paramilitary terrorists. Sinn Fein calls for 'community policing', by which it means the consolidation of IRA rule in Catholic areas. The loyalist paramilitaries can see the attraction of a parallel form of community policing in Protestant areas.

The loyalists appear to have no strategy beyond that. But the IRA does. It will collect as much as it can hope to gain from peace dividends in reward for its ceasefire. These are rich in the Republic, and continue to accumulate. This week Dublin is preparing to abolish special courts and emergency powers. It is politically incorrect, in the republic right now, to allude to the continuing existence of a still-illegal private army with 100 tons of arms and ammunition, including three tons of Semtex. Through Sinn Fein, and with the good offices of SDLP leader John Hume, the IRA has achieved an unprecedented symbiosis with the government in Dublin: a rich peace dividend indeed.

On the British side, the peace pickings are more meagre, but not insignificant: legal reopening of border roads (after their repeated illegal 'reopenings by the community', organised by Sinn Fein); withdrawal of British troops from the streets of Derry; indications that British officials will soon meet with Sinn Fein. Beyond that, the IRA can hope for the release of at least some 'political prisoners'.

But the concessions to be expected from Mr Major's government are bound to run out pretty soon, and well short of a British withdrawal. When the peace dividends run out, the IRA will cry 'betrayal' and get on with the job of destabilising Northern Ireland. I would expect the build-up to be well under way by next Easter.

I don't think Mr Reynolds yet appreciates how awkward things are going to get for him, when the breaking point between the IRA and the British is reached. He is, implicitly a mediator between the two. But when the breaking point is reached, Mr Reynolds will have to choose. Cosy Anglo-Irish relations and cosy relations with the IRA will cease to be compatible. The Irish public will expect the maintenance of the former, in preference to the latter. But if Mr Reynolds acts as his electorate would wish, he is likely to find that his present allies in the peace process will turn very ugly indeed. He ought to be thinking of these things now, before it is too late.