Yeltsin's war of nerves tries his peace emissary

As commanders from both sides of the Chechen war yesterday extended a fragile six-day peace by signing a new truce, one baffling question dominated all others. What is Boris Yeltsin playing at? Why is he snubbing his own envoy to the war zone, Alexander Lebed?

Three days ago the retired general interrupted his peace negotiations in Chechnya and rushed to Moscow, saying he wanted a meeting with the President to discuss the separatists' proposals for settling the war, which has cost 35,000 lives, drained the Kremlin's coffers, humiliated its army, and exposed Russia to international condemnation.

He needed the President's personal clearance before signing a deal. The details are unknown, but reports yesterday suggested they envisaged giving Chechnya "special status" within Russia, although a full settlement could be delayed for up to five years. The Chechen army, which the rebels want to be independent, but which the Russians want to oversee, is one sticking- point.

What was Mr Yeltsin's response? His aides announced he had left for a holiday. Mr Lebed, who is desperate for a quick settlement, waited around for two days before being ordered by the Kremlin yesterday to deliver a written report. According to the general's aides, only then would the President decide whether to interrupt his relaxation and see him, or talk to him by phone.

This is the second time Mr Yeltsin has turned a frosty shoulder to his peace envoy; last week he declared he was not "entirely satisfied" with Mr Lebed's mission, unaware that he was close to a truce. Why, Russians are wondering, is their president undermining his envoy at a crucial time?

Firstly, Mr Yeltsin appears to be trying to insulate himself from the backlash that will arise if a final settlement over Chechnya is reached. As the head of an unstable country, where the support of the military remains crucial, he wants Mr Lebed to bear the brunt of the ire of the die-hard generals, and senior officials in the "power" ministries - defence, security, and interior - who believe withdrawing from the Muslim republic is tantamount to a humiliating defeat.

Flak is already flying. The dominant Communist faction in parliament has alleged that the President granted "unconstitutional" powers to Mr Lebed as his Chechen envoy, which they plan to challenge in court.

Its deputy speaker, Sergei Baburin, yesterday accused Mr Lebed of masterminding a "political crime" - the secession of Chechnya from Russia. There are also more personal factors. In the two months since his appointment as security tsar, Mr Lebed has provided the President with several reasons to bear a grudge. He was a moving force behind the firing of Mr Yeltsin's bosom pal and chief bodyguard, Alexander Korzhakov, as well as several other hawks.

He has embarrassed Mr Yeltsin by naming his own choice of a Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov, before Mr Yeltsin had announced a decision (He gave Mr Rodionov the job). He has angered him by calling for the sacking of his Interior Minister, Anatoly Kulikov, at a press conference, which the President rejected. And, worse, he has shown a talent for the limelight that only he, Boris Yeltsin, can match.

Mr Lebed is proving to be highly media-savvy and popular with the press, which mostly backs his peace efforts. For a man with Mr Yeltsin's ego and sense of showmanship, this must be painful to behold.

However, whether Mr Yeltsin's strategy of snubbing his envoy is of his own making is questionable.

The President is in poor health. He also has a habit of abruptly cutting himself off from affairs, and heading off into the country to brood - especially after big events, such as the elections in July. The decision to shut out Mr Lebed could easily be the work of the President's staff, headed by Anatoly Chubais.

This is not the first time Mr Lebed has had difficulties with the Kremlin's inner circle; last week he suggested someone was issuing orders, using a facsimile of Mr Yeltsin's signature.

Mr Chubais, the President's chief of staff, is committed to ending the Chechen war. But he is ambitious, and is no doubt keen to put down a rival. As a liberal, he is also likely to view Mr Lebed's accumulation of power, and his desire to oversee all the security structures, as alarmingly undemocratic.