Once more, in a time of crisis, Arafat proves himself a survivor

Yasser Arafat's mistakes and misjudgments have won him many enemies over theyears. But even they would admit, as they watched him grasp the hand ofTony Blair yesterday, that the Palestinian leader is a master of making thebest of a terrible situation.

A month ago, his position appeared abysmal. There was a real threat that theAmerican-led war on terrorism, propelled as it was by revulsion and furyover the events of 11 September, would be turned against Palestiniansfighting to end to the 34-year  Israeli occupation.

Israel moved swiftly to try to persuade the outside world to see Mr Arafatas no different from Osama bin Laden. As anti-Arab, anti-Muslim sentimentsswept the United States, there was a risk that he would become a politicaluntouchable, a man with whom no American politician would want to be caughtwithin the same camera frame. For a day or two, there was a generalconsensus that, in the new world order spirited up by the  murderoushijackers, Palestinians were doomed to be reviled or, at best, forgotten.

This scenario was not lost on Yasser Arafat, who is not lacking in survivalskills, and who did not want to repeat the mistakes he made by supportingSaddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War. He at once loudly condemned the USattacks, publicly disassociated the Palestinians from them, and ruthlesslybegan to stifle expressions of support for Osama bin Laden emanating fromsome of the more anti-American and downtrodden corners of the occupiedterritories.

A week after the attacks, he was in his beachside Gaza presidentialheadquarters in front of the TV cameras - with US, UN and EU officialsarrayed behind him - announcing a ceasefire in which he recognised anewIsrael's right to live in "safe and secure" boundaries. The truce ran intotrouble almost at once. But he did enough to persuade the US and its alliesthat he meant business. Â

Three weeks after that, he showed them again. His security forces in theGaza Strip shot dead three people - including a 12-year-old boy - who hadbeen among a crowd of students from the Islamic university demonstratingagainst the war on Afghanistan. It was a dangerous moment, which threatenedto pitch the anti-American Gaza "street" against his CIA-trained securityforces and pro-Washington rule.

Before the intifada began, the street had been boiling with resentment overMr Arafat's inept and corrupt Palestinian Authority, his ties with theAmericans - seen by most Arabs as the hated Israel's parent body -  andthe failures and deceptions of the US-mediated Oslo  "peace process". Thisdied down when the uprising began, as the population united in itsopposition to Israel and the army that was repeatedly killing them.

Now it threatened to explode anew, and might have done so, had Mr Arafat -deft as ever -  secured an agreement to calm matters down in Gaza rom thepopular Islamic militants, Hamas. President Bush was duly impressed  A fewdays later, urged the world to applaud Mr Arafat's efforts in containingthe radicals.

It was a considerable reversal of fortune for the chairman of the PLO andPalestinian "president". The Palestinians had been preparing for the firstanniversary of the intifada when the two Boeing jets smashed into the twintowers of the World Trade Centre. Those reflecting on the year of bloodshedcould not have failed to conclude that - in concrete terms - it hadachieved nothing, even though its popular support did not appear to belessening.

More than 600 Palestinians had been killed and many thousands maimed, andyet the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had only becomemore intense. Ehud Barak - who was always a far tougher and more ruthlessnegotiating partner than  the outside world was willing to believe - hadbeen replaced in the prime minister's office by another even moreintransigent ex-general in the form of Ariel Sharon. Although Israel'sLabour party had, as a condition of joining the coalition government,squeezed an agreement out of Mr Sharon that there would be no moresettlement building in the occupied territories, new outposts weresprouting like mustard seed.

The economy in the occupied territories, and especially the Gaza Strip, wasin ruins. Israel - pummelled by suicide bombers - had closed in on itself,and was now only interested in the most effective ways of keeping thePalestinians from crossing the 1967 borders into Israel itself. Ceasefireafter ceasefire had failed, consigned to the graveyard amid allegationsfrom each side that the other had failed to enforce it.

All mutual trust had - and still has - vanished. Most importantly of all, asUri Savir - once Israel's chief Oslo negotiator - told the BBC this week,the embattled and worried public on both both sides had become convincedthat the other was not remotely interested in making peace.

This was the picture that confronted George Bush when he entered office. Hehad seen Bill Clinton's efforts to make history in the Middle East collapsefirst into dust and then, two months after the failed Camp David summit,into war. Having failed to win the popular vote, he and his team weresurely aware of the hazards of venturing too deeply into the conflict,especially as it would almost certainly mean unleashing the formidable andhostile forces of the US pro-Israeli lobby. He urged both sides to end theviolence and airily recommending them to adopt the now dust-caked plandevised by a committee led by ex-US senator George Mitchell for returningto talks. Â But it was clear that he did not want to get involved.

Ariel Sharon - once shunned in Washington for his draconian right-wing viewsand links with the 1982 Sabra and Chatila massacres - soon began to winfavour. On 22 May, Â he called for a ceasefire, which he began to enforceunilaterally. His army regularly violated it, although it used noticeablyfewer of the routinely excessive tactics of the previous months. Israel nowbegan to persuade the West that the villains of the peace were thePalestinians, and especially Yasser Arafat.

Reports soon began to circulate that Washington was pleased with Israel'sso-called "policy of restraint", and increasingly fed up with Mr Arafat,who had failed to end his side of the violence or to arrest Islamicmilitants behind it. Â It was made clear that Mr Arafat - a regular WhiteHouse guest during the Clinton era - would not be welcome chez Bush.

Not any more. Now, realising that the West needs him if it is to win overmoderate Muslim opinion, Mr Arafat is waiting for the invitation that willtake him back into the Oval Office.