Inside File: Lubbers: a Major error of judgement

AS officials in Brussels fret over what life will be like under their new boss, whom they regard as a non-entity who will weaken the powers of the European Commission, it is worth telling two anecdotes, explaining why one of Britain's choices was a non-starter in the eyes of Europe's two most powerful leaders.

Back in the early days of the drive towards German unification, Helmut Kohl was faced with the intractable issue of Poland's western border with Germany and recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. Aware of the immense domestic pressure by more than 12 million Germans expelled from Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the Chancellor equivocated and prevaricated for months. The rest of Europe's politicians knew the delicate nature of his internal policy manoeuvring, and kept off the subject.

That is, except for Ruud Lubbers. At the Strasbourg EC summit in December 1989, the Dutch leader marched up to the Chancellor over pre-dinner drinks and demanded to know, 'What do you think you are doing?' and 'What is this Oder- Neisse line anyway?'. Whether he was being tired and emotional, or just plain maladroit, nobody speaks to Mr Kohl that way. Hence the comment by a German envoy during the struggle to find a compromise candidate for the commission: 'We will never accept Lubbers, because nobody can control him.'

Even more startling is the story of why Francois Mitterrand would have none of Mr Lubbers. The latter incurred the wrath of the French President during the most fraught negotiations over the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. John Major was upsetting everybody, and the French government more than anyone else, with his opposition to the Social Chapter and the clause on Economic and Monetary Union. Everybody, that is, except for Mr Lubbers, who with what the French called 'typical Dutch Atlanticist penchant' weighed in with drafts even more anti-communautaire than those of Mr Major. 'Mitterrand was so angry he threatened to leave the room,' said a source in the chamber.

So enter Jacques Santer, whom the Franco-German axis seems more confident of controlling in the face of British foot-dragging. Some officials in the Commission say that such a weak president will turn the body into a disaster area. But here is the twist: others, including those in the president's cabinet, are more confident. 'So long as we have the right commissioners in place, politically able and not mere technocrats, things might still work out,' said one source. Who might those be? 'Well, you know. People like Sir Leon Brittan and Neil Kinnock.'

ARGENTINA and Israel are making common cause in New York to ask the Security Council to address international terrorism, following last week's bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires that killed 95 people.

Gad Yaacobi, Israel's envoy to the UN, has said that investigations 'have pointed clearly to Iranian involvement' and 'Iran considers terrorism an acceptable means to achieve its political ends and views its opponents as legitimate targets for terrorist attacks. Iran has been and remains a prime sponsor of terrorism throughout the world.'

Best of luck. Britain, on whose soil the next anti-Israeli attack took place, sought to single out Iran in a similar way more than two weeks before. The final statement at the Group of Seven summit in Naples was to have included, for the first time, a specific reference to both Iran and terrorism in the same paragraph. British diplomats were proudly leaking that fact 24 hours in advance. The peg was, of course, the discovery of direct links between Iran and the provisional IRA. However, when the final text of the statement was issued, it was only to 'condemn terrorism in all its forms, especially when state-sponsored, and reaffirm our resolve to co-operate in combating it with determination'. Of the Islamic Republic, there was not a mention.