British Army stretched to fulfil UN missions

ANY British force sent to Kuwait to deter further Iraqi moves would be small, if only because the British Army's capacity for further commitments is limited, political and military sources said yesterday. Pressure on army strength could also determine the type of troops offered, although last night the United Nations had still not formally requested more forces.

The Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, yesterday supported the idea of a permanent UN staff to mastermind the increasing number of operations in the post-Cold War world, but rejected a permanent UN standing military force. He defended the rigorous enforcement of no-fly zones in Iraq but not in Bosnia. And he warned against committing forces where there was 'no military solution, but only clamour for 'something to be done' '.

Mr Rifkind said 'the assets we have available for peace-keeping are limited'. He said nations contributing forces to the expanding pool of UN peace-keeping operations should press for explicit time limits either to the operation or on the period for which that country needed to commit forces - reflecting widespread concern about being dragged into endless commitments. He cited the example of Cyprus, where UN troops have been deployed since 1964.

Mr Rifkind was speaking to the Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies in London on Peace-keeping or Peace-making. His address followed informal indications that Kuwait had requested troops from Britain and France.

The Army is heavily stretched at home because units are not available while they are being amalgamated, as Mr Rifkind acknowledged yesterday. Even if the UK wanted to send troops, any further commitment, even a relatively small one, could add significantly to the Army's problems.

The Army aims to allow soldiers an interval between six-month unaccompanied tours - such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia or the Gulf - of 24 months. In 1992-93 it has gone down to 17 months. This is partly due to the pressures of amalgamating regiments. But if there are further commitments - more troops to Bosnia or Kuwait - it will not be possible to achieve even that target.

The greatest pressure is on infantry units which are in great demand for Northern Ireland and Bosnia. If Britain responds to the Kuwaiti request it might send tanks, thus not adding to the infantry pressures. An armoured (tank) or armoured reconnaissance (light tank) regiment and support - perhaps 500 troops - might be a manageable commitment, although the force could be smaller: a company or squadron.

However, there are two further problems. The Kuwaiti request is understood to have been for three infantry battalions, none of which the British could provide easily, and they are probably needed soon. Armour tends to travel by sea, although Scimitar light tanks such as those being used in Bosnia could be taken by air.

Mr Rifkind said Britain might decline to contribute forces. 'We should not be coy about this,' he said. He said it was 'not only a perception of the rightness of the cause but also 'is there a military solution to the problem?' '

Mr Rifkind was asked why no- fly zones which did not have specific UN backing were being enforced in Iraq, while a declared UN no-fly zone was not being enforced in Bosnia, and other UN resolutions not enforced with regard to Israel. He replied that the Iraqis had been using combat aircraft against the Kurds and Shias, whereas they were not being used by either side in Bosnia. 'If combat aircraft were to be used . . . that would be treated with the same degree of seriousness,' he said. In Israel, a military effort would be 'inappropriate and undesirable,' he added.