Titan sub hearing live: OceanGate volunteer said nobody was concerned until sub ‘was really overdue’ from dive

8:30 a.m. – Daily Opening

8:45 a.m. – 10 Minute Recess

9:00 a.m. – Mr. David Lochridge

10:30 a.m. – 10 Minute Recess

10:45 a.m. Mr. David Lochridge

12:30 p.m. – Lunch

1:30 p.m. – Mr. David Lochridge

2:45 p.m. – 10 Minute Recess

The Canadian Coast Guard had been hearing a consistent “knocking” sound, Catterson said. The witness explained that the consistency signaled that the noise was coming from humans, distinct from the ocean sounds.

He thought the submersible was drifting.

The Polar Prince did not have a remotely operative vehicle (ROV) on board.

When a ROV did arrive, and it was determined that it could help find the submersible, it went to the bottom of the seafloor but died. So efforts then included recovering this “dead ROV,” Catterson said. They then tried to use sonar off the ROV to detect the submersible, but it didn’t work.

Pelagic Research Services’ ROV later arrived at the scene, and found debris within 10 minutes, he said.

Catterson said he was part of the search and rescue operations. He was on the Polar Prince, the support vessel.

“We did everything that we could to determine whether it was a communications issue or something else,” he recalled.

Both the tracking and communications both stopped because OceanGate was using the accoustic modem, which is tied to the depth sensor for tracking purposes, also as a communications link, which was atypical, he said.

“Normally there would have been two devices,” Catterson told the panel. “This is the first case I’ve ever seen” where communications and tracking were tied together, meaning “when one fails, so does the other.”

The expediton was repeatedly “weathered out,” he said, given the intense fog.

On June 18th, he said it was sunny, so it was really the only day they could have gone. It was like the day was “blessed,” he said.

OceanGate had an “extensive pre-dive,” Catterson told the panel. They started at 4am, four hours before the submersible’ launched.

He said he had never experienced such a lengthy process: “There were so many things that had to be checked. Subs do not have that many things to check over.”

Catterson was tasked with the dive checks.

“There were no red flags,” he said. “It was a good day.”

When asked whether it was typical for submersibles to be classed, Catterson said: “yes.”

The Titan “would have been the first one that was not classed,” he said.

Catterson recalled conversations he had with Rush about needing to get the submersible classified — which he described as “short.”

The former contractor said he told Rush that classification is “proof of due diligence” and a way to get insurance. However, Catterson got the impression that classing the vessel “wasn’t a big of a worry for him as it is for most people.”

Catterson has been working with manned submersibles since the 1980s for a variety of companies.

He started working with OceanGate in 2003 or 2004. He said the company’s co-founders were unfamiliar with subs when he was hired.

“There was no drug testing,” Carl said.

When asked about whether safety was ever an agenda item of an OceanGate meeting, she said she couldn’t recall.

She revealed the company “basically didn’t have any money coming in” aside from investors.

“We got very low but to the point where I got very concerned that we weren’t going to make payroll one week,” she said. Rush would essentially provide a temporary loan to the company when that would happen, she said. “He would write a check.”

Carl was released as a witness.

Carl had received some pilot traning in addition to her other roles, where she spotted some “red flags.”

“As a pilot in training, there were a couple things that gave me pause,” she said. She said she had asked Mr Nissen, the first witness, about the acrylic dome, however he wouldn’t let her see the paperwork for it.

She added that the O-Ring groove also “looked odd.”

She said she brought most of her concerns to David Lochridge, who was later fired after a writing an inspection report detailing his concerns about the vessel.

Shortly after showing Rush the inspection report, Carl understood that Lochridge was likely going to be terminated. She recalled that Lochridge had insisted on unmanned testing but Rush wanted to push forward, leading them to an “impasse” in which they had to “part ways.”

After the meeting with Lochridge, she said she started looking for another job. “If that was their attitude toward safety,” she didn’t want to work there, she said.

She left in February 2018.

During their testimony on Monday, two former employees told the Coast Guard panel about their involvement in the company — including their impressions of Stockton Rush.

Both former employees described a man who often made sure to get his way.

“All decisons were made by Stockton,” Carl revealed, even among discussions with board members.

Nissen had also said that dealing with Rush was like “death by a thousand cuts.”

The engineer said: “Stockton would fight for what he wanted...And he wouldn’t give an inch much. At all,” he said. “Most people would eventually back down from Stockton.”