Why did Rishi Sunak make the fateful decision to call an early election?

One week on, and the sheer scale of it makes the Conservatives’ defeat feel almost preordained. That late in the last parliament, there probably wasn’t much chance that they were ever going to win it, or even secure a hung parliament. Yet questions persist about the timing, and what made Rishi Sunak choose to go to the country long before what was the widely expected prospective date in the autumn.

As The Independent reports today, trends in the mortgage market were a deciding factor...

Homeowners are one of the Conservatives’ traditionally strong sources of support, and, before he announced the election on 22 May, Sunak and his advisers became concerned about what might befall them in the autumn. Hundreds of thousands of people who had taken out substantial mortgages when interest rates were at record low levels a few years ago were due to face an interest-rate reset at the end of the initial fixed-rate period.

Given that the Bank rate has risen sharply since the end of the pandemic, the prospect was that, every month, many thousands of homeowners would face a leap in their monthly bill – on average about £240 – and of course, some would be in line for an even bigger rise. The calculation was that every month an extra 130,000 people would be moved on to a worse rate.

The howls of anguish would have had a wider impact on economic confidence, and thus on the “feelgood factor” every leader needs to help them win power, which would be harder to generate as the year went on.

Yes, but not by enough. At the start of 2024 there were high hopes, and the succeeding months saw some heavy hints from the Bank of England that rate cuts were on the way. However, they have still not arrived, and the relative strength of economic growth in the most recent figures, coupled with trends in wages, suggests that any reductions will be small. A cut of, say, a quarter of a percentage point wouldn’t make up for the much larger increase in people’s mortgage rates in any case.

The element of surprise can be an advantage in political battles, and the choice of a general election date is one of the most potent weapons a prime minister holds in their armoury. Apart from some insiders, party members were not aware that an election was about to be called, and many experienced it as an unwelcome shock as they had not prepared candidates or propaganda material, added to which was the issue of booking advertising space (which Labour had bought up when it spotted that the bookmakers’ odds on a July poll had shortened drastically).

Many hoped so, setting aside the hikes in mortgage bills. Inflation hit the 2 per cent target on 19 June; it was expected to stay low and probably fall further, but with some upward blips later in the year. Wage growth was moderate but still relatively good, too. So Sunak could have pointed to further economic successes. His more fundamental problem was that economic sentiment had been improving since about a year ago, but his and his party’s ratings had stayed stubbornly low.

It remained in the balance. Some token flights could have taken off over the summer, but it was also quite likely that the government would be frustrated by legal challenges time and again – to add to the perception of their never being able to get anything done.

Besides, the Rwanda plan was never that popular with the electorate, and certainly not to the extent of driving many votes. Those most worried about migration would only have been satisfied by visible evidence that Sunak had indeed “stopped the boats”, and that wasn’t going to happen. Besides, whatever Sunak said or did would always be trumped by Nigel Farage.

All the indications were that Farage was indeed going to America to support Donald Trump in the run-up to the November election. So if Sunak had waited until then, he could have been more certain that Farage wouldn’t be involved in the campaign – and we now know that Reform may have taken as much as 4 or 5 per cent of the Conservatives’ vote share.

Other things being equal, the Tories would still have lost, but would have retained a much higher parliamentary base – and stopped Farage himself from getting into the Commons.

We will have to wait until Sunak feels ready to tell his side of the story, but even when he does, the “what ifs” will still be debated.