How the government got into a mess over immigration – and what could happen next

Immigration continues to be a heated topic as Britain heads toward an election. Record numbers of inward migrants have added to existing concerns about “illegal” cases of people crossing the English Channel in small boats to claim asylum – an activity deemed lawful under various international conventions on refugees and human rights, but recently outlawed in domestic legislation. The Rwanda plan remains in a state of suspended animation after the Supreme Court ruled it unlawful. “Emergency” legislation and a new Rwanda treaty have been promised, but timescales are unclear. Immigration as an issue has also become a central theme in the struggle for the leadership and soul of the Tory party.

What is the government’s policy on migration?

This is no flippant query. One frustrated Tory MP asked the immigration minister, Robert Jenrick, that very question at questions in the Commons, and received something of a pro-forma answer.

The policy used to be clear. In the 2019 manifesto, Conservatives promised to “fix our immigration system”, because “only by establishing immigration controls and ending freedom of movement will we be able to attract the high-skilled workers we need.” An Australian-style points-based system would ensure “there will be fewer lower-skilled migrants and overall numbers will come down”.

However, post-Brexit Britain still needs people with all levels of skill, and that demand turned out to be inconsistent with the reduction of overall numbers.

So the 2019 approach hasn’t worked; and there is no cohesive policy to replace it.

How important is the Rwanda plan?

It has assumed a dominant place in government policy, disproportionate to the numbers who will be forcibly deported. It is supposed to act as a “deterrent” – but this claim is undermined by its modest scale, as well as continued delays to its introduction. Rishi Sunak pledged that “stop the boats” would be a priority for 2024 and speaks of doing whatever it takes to achieve this aim, including immediate urgent action to rescue the Rwanda plan. By contrast, his new home secretary James Cleverly has said it is “not the be all and end all” of policy, though most recently in the Commons he described the plan as a “key element in reducing migration”.

Why is it stalled?

Ironically, one issue is sovereignty. A British suggestion that the asylum process in Rwanda can be made more secure (and resistant to legal challenge) if British staff are running it has fallen foul of Kigali. Simply codifying the existing UK-Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding won’t satisfy the clear legal requirement that there should be no risk of “refoulment” – that is, returning people to their place of origin if they would then face torture, persecution or death. Mr Sunak has even suggested that Rwandans could send refugees back to Britain instead, which would rather defeat the point of the exercise.

Besides all that, and the ongoing threat of legal action, the House of Lords is bound to delay the passage of the emergency legislation brought in response to the Supreme Court ruling. They will feel emboldened to do so because of the Rwanda plan’s uncertain legal status and because there was no mention of such a scheme in the last Conservative manifesto, leaving it with no democratic mandate.

Did Rishi mislead Suella?

We don’t know. The much-vaunted document they supposedly agreed in return for her supporting him in the second Tory leadership campaign last year hasn’t yet emerged (though one newspaper claims to have seen a copy). According to the Braverman camp, it was a binding commitment to tighten up the legal migration rules on visas; the PM’s team say it was merely a discussion paper. In any case, it’s hardly a contract.

Would restrictions such as raising the salary thresholds for a visa reduce migration?

Yes, but the law of unintended consequences – a law that can’t be repealed – would intervene. One way to limit the number of people coming to work in health and social care is to push the salary threshold for getting a visa to, say, £40,000 per annum; at well above the current market rate, it would curb the flow of migrants into such roles. However, it would also drive up wages in the sector to cope with the ensuing staff shortages. Even if there were enough British applicants with the right skills, the increased wage bill would mean care homes becoming too expensive for families or going out of business, which would be even more politically damaging.

How else can Britain reduce migration?

By reducing the demand for labour; a prolonged economic slump would probably go a long way to reducing the “pull factor” of jobs, but with the obvious downside of a smaller economy and poorer people. It might even encourage people to leave the UK in search of a better life, as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s.

Why has Labour said it wants to cut migration to ‘a couple of hundred thousand’ a year?

Because this is likely to happen anyway once the number of foreign students begins to stabilise and they return home after completing their studies. The present economic slowdown may also reduce demand for labour generally, and the special humanitarian visa schemes for Hong Kong, Afghanistan and Ukraine will wind down. Labour promises to clear the backlog by recruiting more caseworkers to get through the refugee waiting lists.

Will this be ‘the immigration election’?

No. By the time polling day comes around, the present panic will be over and the state of public services will return to dominate the debates. But migration won’t be an irrelevance. If Nigel Farage makes a comeback he’ll raise the profile of the issue – but equally will repel many who fear his ability to stir up trouble. Given the multiple failures of policy, it seems perverse for the government, and its backbenchers, to draw continual attention to the issue. The only beneficiaries of their continually making and breaking pledges will be Labour and Reform UK.

Who does the public trust on this issue?

The truthful answer is nobody, a sentiment born of long experience. Of the two major parties, Labour enjoys a small lead. Reform UK – formerly the Brexit party, and the heir to Ukip and Farage-ism – must explain why their past promises that Brexit would mean control over borders were so comprehensively proved wrong.