Who is winning the Brexit spin war?

Given that the Boris-Ursula dinner date didn’t go so well, and that neither side has (at least publicly) shifted their negotiating remit or “red lines”, it may be a mystery as to why the UK-EU talks are staggering on into the weekend – and possibly longer. Despite the fact that, in their separate statements, Boris Johnson and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated a decision would be made soon (“the end of the weekend” for Johnson, “Sunday” for von der Leyen), the British foreign secretary, Dominic Raab tellingly left the door open for them to continue even longer. Raab said the trade talks were “unlikely” to go beyond Sunday, but how many “unlikely” things have happened in the past year? After all it is only a year since the British election campaign when Johnson declared there was “zero chance” of a “no-deal Brexit”.

One obvious reason for the continuing willingness to go over the same old arguments is that, as Johnson says “hope springs eternal”, and there is much at stake. Another is that both sides are terrified of getting the blame for ultimate failure, and both are going out of their way to sound reasonable. Both agree compromise on both sides is needed. Both repeat they want a deal, “but not at any price”, most recently restated by Angela Merkel. Both carefully refer to the other side as “our friends”. Both sides, in fact, have their own political pressures and have no wish to add to their problems by seeming to be responsible for a historic “failure of statecraft”, in the prime minister’s terms.  

Both have their case. President von der Leyen chooses to make hers in tones of quiet, sweet reason. Europe is happy to allow Britain special privileged access to the EU single market, the biggest in the world, but on “fair” terms. The British tend to sound more bombastic and aggrieved that the EU isn’t willing to treat the UK as an independent sovereign state in charge of its own money, borders, laws and waters. Johnson told the Commons that the EU wanted Britain to follow its laws and have automatic punishments if it fails to do so – and how could any prime minister accept that?

Some of this, particularly on the British side, is posturing in case if no deal, so the Europeans can be blamed for food shortages, factory closures and general chaos. But partly it is preparation for any deal that involves necessary compromise, or “capitulation” as Brexiteers call it. The PM has to be seen to have gone and done his very best, to have gone the extra kilometre, to have been statesmanlike and acted in the national interest. Whatever he gets will be proclaimed a “fantastic deal”, even if it postponed awkward decisions and compromises on absolute sovereignty. As with the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement it will be spun as British victory, important detail will be fudged, and room will be made for the British to renege on it in future, and generally cheat, with weak arbitration and  oversight built in. Why argue about diverging from EU law long before it’s likely to happen?  

Public opinion is in any case divided. Whatever Johnson returns with will be regarded as a “Brexit betrayal” by the likes of Nigel Farage, who doesn’t like the sound of any British-European “Partnership Agreement”. Similarly it will be seen as vastly inferior to the UK’s now-defunct EU membership terms by “Remainers”. There will be many more though who probably feel fatalistic and deeply weary of the whole thing, and will regard the ultimate outcome as a sort of historic inevitability, given the amount of time and effort and emotional energy that Brexit has consumed. Whatever is settled, in other words, will be regarded as the best that can be settled. The blame game will go on, and the might-have-beens endlessly argued over, but over the next few years it will be the visibility of the success, or otherwise, of Brexit, rather than how we got there, will be how the public come to view it and its famous poster boy currently in No 10.