What is Johnson’s real red line in EU trade negotiations?

There is a lot of bravado, posturing and spin in Boris Johnson’s opening gambit for the trade negotiations with the EU. Ten days ago, David Frost, the prime minister’s negotiator, gave a punchy lecture in Brussels in which he accused the continentals of dismissing Britain’s legitimate desire for independence as “irrational false consciousness”.

Yesterday, the government published its negotiating mandate, a 36-page document setting out what it wants from a deal. The document suggests that the negotiators will walk away if the “broad outline” of a deal has not been agreed by June. That is the deadline for the UK government to ask for an extension to the transition period beyond December, but Johnson has said he will not do so.

The document phrases it in diplomatic language, but says that, without a deal by June, “the government will need to decide whether the UK’s attention should move away from negotiations and focus solely on continuing domestic preparations to exit the transition period in an orderly fashion”.

In plain language, that means the no-deal Brexit that spooked businesses and much of the political class last year could happen on 1 January 2021, although it might be called a “no-trade-deal Brexit”.

Michael Gove, the cabinet office minister who introduced the document in the House of Commons yesterday, was not explicit about walking away either, saying: “We want the best possible trading relationship with the EU, but in pursuit of a deal, we will not trade away our sovereignty.” But the message was clear.

At the same time, Conservative MPs were issued with “lines to take” that seemed designed to reduce expectations that the government will win favourable trade terms. MPs have been told to avoid using words such as “ambitious”, “unique” and “bespoke” to describe the deal they hope to secure.

That suggests to me that Johnson hopes to get some kind of deal, but expects it to be hard to sell as a negotiating triumph.

Is he bluffing when he says he is prepared to walk away? I don’t think so. I think he understands politics enough to know that a threat is ineffective if your opponent doesn’t believe you will carry it out. So he knows that a no-deal exit from the transition period is not ideal, but he thinks he could survive it politically, and he knows he has to be prepared to go through with it to give him the strongest leverage in Brussels.

Which means, I think, that his “red lines” are pretty much what he says they are: no Court of Justice of the EU jurisdiction and exclusive rights over British territorial waters. Most of the rest, though, is open to pragmatic compromise.