Irish Government doubted UK campaign to ‘save David’ Trimble
The Irish Government wanted to appeal to the UK side against ‘manipulating’ every scenario for favourable election results in Northern Ireland.
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Your support makes all the difference.The UK Government was warned that a “save David campaign” for UUP leader Lord Trimble would ruin progress made under the Good Friday Agreement.
Extensive confidential documents in the lead-up to the collapse of Northern Ireland’s institutions in 2002 have been made available to the public as part of annual releases from the Irish National Archives.
They reveal that the Irish Government wanted to appeal to the UK side against “manipulating” every scenario for favourable election results in Northern Ireland, in an effort to protect the peace process.
In the years after the landmark 1998 Good Friday Agreement, a number of outstanding issues left the political environment fraught with tension and disagreement.
Mr Trimble, who won a Nobel Peace Prize with SDLP leader John Hume for their work on the Agreement, was keen to gain wins for the UUP on policing, ceasefire audits and paramilitary disarmament – but also to present his party as firmer on these matters amid swipes from its Unionist rival, the DUP.
These issues were at the front of his mind as he tried to steer his party into Assembly elections planned for May 2003 and continue in his role as the Executive’s first minister despite increasing political pressure.
The documents reveal the extent to which the British and Irish Governments were trying to delicately resolve the contentious negotiations, conscious that moves seen as concessions to one group could provoke anger on the other side.
In June 2002, representatives of the SDLP reported to Irish officials on a recent meeting between Mr Hume’s successor Mark Durkan and Prime Minister Tony Blair on policing and security.
Mr Blair is said to have suggested that the SDLP and UUP were among those who both supported and took responsibility for the Good Friday Agreement.
The confidential report of the meeting says that Mr Durkan, the deputy First Minister, was not sure that Mr Trimble had been correctly categorised. The Prime Minister asked if the SDLP could work more closely with the UUP ahead of the elections.
Mr Durkan argued that Mr Trimble was not only not saleable to nationalists, but also not saleable to half of the UUP – to which Mr Blair and Northern Ireland Secretary John Reid are said to have laughed in agreement.
The SDLP leader further warned that pursuing a “save David” campaign would ruin all they had worked for.
Damien McAteer, an adviser for the SDLP, was recorded as briefing Irish officials on September 10 that it was his view that Mr Trimble was intent on collapsing the institutions in 2003 over expected fallout for Sinn Fein in the wake of the Colombia Three trial, where men linked to the party were charged with training Farc rebels – but predicted the UUP leader would be “in the toilet” by January, when an Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) meeting was due to take place.
A week later in mid September, Mr Trimble assured Irish premier Bertie Ahern that the next UUC meeting to take place in two days’ time would be “okay but not great” and insisted he was not planning to play any “big game”.
It was at that meeting that he made the bombshell announcement that the UUP would pull out of the Executive if the IRA had not disbanded by January 18.
The move came as a surprise to the Irish officials who, along with their UK counterparts, did not see the deadline as realistic. Sinn Fein described the resolution as a “wreckers’ charter”.
Doubts were raised that there would be any progress on substantive issues as parties would not be engaged in “pre-election skirmishing”.
As that could lead to a UUP walkout and the resulting suspension of the institutions, the prospect of delaying the elections was raised while bringing forward the vote was ruled out.
Therefore, the two Governments stressed the need to cooperate as a stabilising force to protect the Agreement – despite not being sure how that process would survive through the January 18 deadline.
The Irish officials became worried that the British side did not share their view that Mr Trimble was not “salvageable” and that the fundamental dynamic in the UUP was now Agreement scepticism, the confidential documents state.
In a meeting days after the UUC announcements, Mr Reid is recorded in the documents as saying that as infuriating as it was, Mr Trimble was at that moment the “most enlightened Unionist we have”.
The Secretary said he would explore what the UUP leader needed to “survive” the period between January 18 and the election, believing a significant prize could avoid him being “massacred”.
Such planning went out the window just weeks later, when hundreds of PSNI officers were involved in raids of several buildings – including Sinn Fein’s offices in Stormont.
The Governments cannot be manipulating and finessing every scenario to engineer the right result.
The resulting “Stormontgate” spy-ring scandal accelerated the collapse of powersharing, with the UUP pulling out of the institutions – and the Secretary of State suspending the Assembly and Executive on October 14.
For his part, Irish officials were briefed that Mr Reid was said to be “gung ho” about the prospect of exercising direct rule – reportedly making no mention of the Irish Government in a meeting with Mr Trimble and Mr Durkan on that day.
The Northern Ireland Secretary was given a new role and Paul Murphy was appointed as his successor.
A note on speaking points for a meeting with Mr Murphy in April showed that the Irish side believed the May elections should go ahead: “At a certain stage the political process has to stand on its own feet.
“The Governments cannot be manipulating and finessing every scenario to engineer the right result.
“We have to start treating the parties and the people as mature and trusting that they have the discernment to make the right choices.”
However, the elections planned for May did not materialise, instead delayed until November. Mr Trimble would go on to lose his Westminster seat – and stewardship of the UUP – in 2005.
The November election saw the DUP emerge as the largest parties – but direct rule continued as Ian Paisley’s refused to share power with Sinn Fein, which Martin McGuinness’ colleagues.
The parties eventually agreed to work together following further elections in 2007.
– This article is based on documents in 2024/130/5, 2024/130/6, 2024/130/15