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Who is to blame for the Grenfell fire? The key figures criticised by report

They include figures from both local and central government accused of repeated failures in their duties

Christopher McKeon
Wednesday 04 September 2024 07:21 EDT
People gather in front of the makeshift memorial created on the wall surrounding Grenfell tower in west London
People gather in front of the makeshift memorial created on the wall surrounding Grenfell tower in west London (AFP/Getty)

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Several individuals have faced criticism in the Grenfell Inquiryā€™s final report over their role in the disaster.

They include figures from both local and central government accused of repeated failures in their duties.

The Government will ā€œcarefully considerā€ the findings of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry to ā€œensure that such a tragedy cannot occur againā€, the Prime Minister has said.

The inquiryā€™s final report, published on Wednesday, found the fire that killed 72 people in 2017 was the result of ā€œdecades of failureā€ by central government and the construction industry to act on the dangers of flammable cladding.

In a written statement, Sir Keir Starmer noted the report had found ā€œsubstantial and widespread failingsā€ and thanked inquiry chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick and panel members Thouria Istephan and Ali Akbor for their work.

He said: ā€œThe Government will carefully consider the report and its recommendations, to ensure that such a tragedy cannot occur again.

ā€œI hope that those outside government will do the same.

ā€œGiven the detailed and extensive nature of the report, a further and more in-depth debate will be held at a later date.ā€

The Prime Minister added: ā€œMy thoughts today are wholly with those bereaved by, and survivors of, the Grenfell Tower tragedy and the residents in the immediate community.

ā€œThis day is for them.

ā€œI hope that Sir Martinā€™s report can provide the truth they have sought for so long, and that it is a step towards the accountability and justice they deserve.ā€

Below are the key figures criticised by name in the inquiry.

ā€“ Lord Pickles, communities and local government secretary, 2010-2015

As secretary of state in the department responsible for building regulations, the inquiry found Lord Pickles oversaw a culture focused on deregulation, where civil servants felt unable to raise concerns about fire safety.

Lord Pickles oversaw the department responsible for building regulations between 2010 and 2015 (Ben Birchall/PA)
Lord Pickles oversaw the department responsible for building regulations between 2010 and 2015 (Ben Birchall/PA) (PA Archive)

Sir Martin said there was a ā€œwealth of materialā€ to show Lord Pickles was an ā€œardent supporterā€ of deregulation and ā€œthe pressure within the department to reduce red tape was so strong that civil servants felt the need to put it at the forefront of every decisionā€.

Lord Pickles himself told the inquiry he would have regarded it as ā€œludicrousā€ if civil servants thought the drive for deregulation covered building regulations, but Sir Martin said documentary evidence supported claims by officials that deregulation was ā€œa dominant influence within the departmentā€.

He said it was ā€œnot uncommonā€ for the building regulations and standards division to receive emails thanking them for their efforts in meeting Lord Picklesā€™ ā€œambition on deregulationā€.

The report said: ā€œIn the years that followed the Lakanal House fire the Governmentā€™s deregulatory agenda, enthusiastically supported by some junior ministers and the secretary of state (Lord Pickles), dominated the departmentā€™s thinking to such an extent that even matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded.ā€

It concluded: ā€œThe failure to foster a culture in which concerns could be raised and frank advice given represents a serious failure of leadership on the part of ministers and senior officials.ā€

During the inquiry itself, Lord Pickles provoked outrage from survivors after giving the wrong figure for the number of people killed in the disaster, saying 96 rather than 72.

ā€“ Brian Martin, principal construction professional, Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)

Brian Martin had been the civil servant in charge of building regulations for fire safety for 17 years by the time of the fire, including the guidance in Approved Document B, the official fire safety guidance for the construction industry.

Sir Martinā€™s inquiry found he had been given ā€œtoo much freedom of action without adequate oversightā€ and repeatedly failed to bring fire safety risks to the attention of his superiors.

The report said: ā€œIt is not clear how Brian Martin was chosen to be the official with day-to-day responsibility for the Building Regulations and Approved Document B, why he was allowed to remain in that position for so long, or why he was allowed to wield so much influence over the departmentā€™s response to developments.ā€

The inquiry found Mr Martin had shown ā€œlittle appetiteā€ for reviewing Approved Document B, even after the inquests into a fire at Lakanal House in Camberwell, south London, in 2009.

He also played a role in shutting down the Building Research Establishmentā€™s investigation into the fire after barely a month, citing concerns about the cost of an investigation.

The inquiry accused him of making ā€œmisleading statementsā€ to the Lakanal House inquests and providing ā€œdisingenuousā€ advice to then-housing minister Don Foster after the inquests concluded in 2013, in which he ā€œset out to give the minister to understand that the coronerā€™s concerns were in fact groundlessā€.

ā€“ Carl Stokes, fire assessor, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO)

A former firefighter, Carl Stokes was responsible for carrying out fire assessments for the whole of KCTMOā€™s estate.

The inquiry found he had been ā€œallowed to drift intoā€ his role, for which he was not qualified.

The report said: ā€œHe had misrepresented his experience and qualifications (some of which he had invented) and was ill-qualified to carry out fire risk assessments on buildings the size and complexity of Grenfell Tower, let alone to hold the entire TMO portfolio.

ā€œAs a result there was a danger that fire risk assessments would not meet the required standard.ā€

The report said Mr Stokesā€™ methods for carrying out fire risk assessments ā€œsuffered from serious shortcomingsā€, including often failing to check whether the TMO had taken action to respond to identified risks.

London Fire Brigade (LFB) officers had also expressed concerns about his competence, but KCTMO ā€œcontinued to rely uncritically on himā€, making the danger ā€œmore acuteā€.

Grenfell United, representing some of the bereaved and survivors, said it was ā€œa damning indictment of this country that amateurs, like Carl Stokes and Brian Martin, can pose to be experts, putting countless lives at risk and taking the lives of our loved onesā€.

ā€“ Robert Black, chief executive, KCTMO

The inquiry found an ā€œentrenched reluctanceā€ on the part of KCTMO boss Robert Black to tell either his board or the local authorityā€™s scrutiny committee about fire safety issues or LFBā€™s concerns about compliance with safety regulations.

Robert Black quit as KCTMO chief executive 16 days after the fire (Grenfell Tower Inquiry/PA)
Robert Black quit as KCTMO chief executive 16 days after the fire (Grenfell Tower Inquiry/PA) (PA Media)

It said: ā€œThat failure was all the more serious because there were chronic and systemic failings in the TMOā€™s management of fire safety of which the board should have been made aware.ā€

During the inquiry, retired judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick heard Mr Black waited two hours before forwarding a list of residents to firefighters on the night of the blaze, saying his organisation had no role in emergency planning.

Mr Black quit as KCTMO chief executive on June 30 2017, 16 days after the fire.

ā€“ Nicholas Holgate, chief executive, Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC)

Nicholas Holgateā€™s response to the disaster was strongly criticised by Sir Martin, who found he had been ā€œunduly concerned for RBKCā€™s reputationā€.

Nicholas Holgate was described as ā€˜unduly concerned for RBKCā€™s reputationā€™ (Kensington and Chelsea Council/PA
Nicholas Holgate was described as ā€˜unduly concerned for RBKCā€™s reputationā€™ (Kensington and Chelsea Council/PA (PA Media)

Describing Mr Holgate as ā€œreluctant to take adviceā€ from those with more experience, Sir Martin said he was ā€œnot capable of taking effective control of the situation and mobilising support of the right kind without delayā€.

He resigned on June 22 2017, eight days after the fire.

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