Zoran Djindjic

Zoran Djindjic, politician: born Bosanski Samac, Yugoslavia 1 August 1950; Mayor of Belgrade 1997; Prime Minister of Serbia 2001-2003; died Belgrade 12 March 2003.

As Prime Minister of Serbia and, before that, as a long-standing opposition politician, Zoran Djindjic excelled at different times both at being an anti-establishment rebel and as a consummate leader- manager. Sometimes he combined the two seemingly conflicting personality traits – perhaps no more so than when he worked as the campaign manager of Vojislav Kostunica, his fellow-opposition figure, in what turned out to be a successful bid in the September 2000 election to unseat Slobodan Milosevic, the authoritarian Yugoslav president, after his 13 years in power.

Djindjic was unlike any other Serbian opposition figure. His guiding spirit was pragmatism. He had little interest in ideology, whether of the nationalist type embraced by Kostunica or of the conservative kind that was espoused by Vuk Draskovic. Nor was he a charismatic figure in the mould of Draskovic.

If anything, Djindjic's approach to politics was most similar to that of Milosevic, his great adversary – although, in spite of the accusations of his critics, he never used the more authoritarian methods of Serbia's one-time strongman. But Djindjic's opportunism, his Machiavellian feel for manipulation and his ability to turn difficult situations to his own advantage, were qualities that had earlier kept Milosevic in office through many turbulent years.

Djindjic never sought popularity. Even many of the supporters in his Democratic Party (DS) and its coalition allies paid him no more than grudging tribute for his energy, professionalism and willingness to press on with reforms. Meanwhile, he was widely criticised for being arrogant and for getting involved in apparently shady backroom deals to consolidate his power.

Born in 1950 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then part of the old Yugoslavia, Djindjic was the son of an officer in the Yugoslav People's Army. His upbringing may have contributed to his seemingly contradictory characteristics. On the one hand, he appeared at times to be a born rebel who wanted to challenge authority. On the other hand, he displayed an outstanding ability as a disciplined organiser.

Already a dissident in his student days, to escape harassment he left Yugoslavia after he graduated from the philosophy school at Belgrade University in 1974. He studied and lectured in West Germany where he earned a PhD at Constance (Konstanz) University.

Djindjic was among the founding members of the centrist DS which emerged as the one-party Communist system collapsed in 1989-90. A master tactician and an effective communicator, he took over as its leader in 1994. But it was two years later that he came to international prominence when he was one of three opposition leaders who led 12 weeks of daily street protests against the attempts of the Milosevic administration to annul the victories of the Zajedno ("Together") bloc in municipal elections. As the Milosevic administration caved in to the demonstrators, Djindjic claimed his prize by becoming mayor of Belgrade in 1997.

Djindjic's triumph lasted only a few months. He soon fell out with Draskovic, his erstwhile ally, who turned against him and ousted Djindjic from the mayor's office. For the next three years Djindjic was in the political wilderness as the DS boycotted elections.

During Nato's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in the course of the conflict over Kosovo in the first half of 1999, Djindjic took refuge in Montenegro, Serbia's partner republic within Yugoslavia, after reports suggested that he was among opposition figures the Milosevic regime was targeting for assassination. In Montenegro Djindjic forged a close relationship with Milo Djukanovic, the Montenegrin President, who had by then turned against Milosevic.

After Belgrade's defeat at Nato's hands Djindjic launched a campaign of street protests in the summer of 1999 – this time with the objective of forcing parliamentary elections in Serbia. However, the campaign did not gather momentum. Milosevic seemed safely entrenched in office – an illusion that prompted him to call early elections for the Yugoslav presidency for September 2000.

Opinion polls suggested that Djindjic stood no chance of unseating Milosevic. So he stayed in the background, directing the campaign of Vojislav Kostunica, the nationalist leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), which had started life as a splinter group from Djindjic's own DS. The tactics worked. Kostunica won the election and Milosevic was forced to hand over power.

While Kostunica gained the largely honorary post of Yugoslav president, Djindjic took over at the real centre of power – as Prime Minister of Serbia. For much of the two years that followed there was a continuing power struggle between Kostunica and Djindjic. Kostunica enjoyed popularity and a power base in the army high command. But Djindjic increasingly consolidated his hold on the rest of the administration: all areas of the government, finance, the police and, to a limited extent, the judiciary.

Djindjic had other advantages, too. Immensely dynamic, businesslike and self-confident, he set out on the path of integrating Serbia with the rest of Europe and the West in general. Youthful, smart and telegenic, he represented a new Western-oriented and outward-looking breed of politicians.

He achieved notable successes. He assembled a very competent team of technocrats, including key figures from the G17 Plus group of reform-minded economists. Together they moved Serbia onto the path of economic reform. Though Djindjic was accused of turning a blind eye to corruption and smuggling and even of having links to organised crime, there was perhaps not a great deal more he could have done while in power for a little over two years to clear out the Augean stables of state-sponsored crime that was part of Milosevic's legacy.

Djukanovic used his links with Djukanovic to establish a loosely knit union of Serbia and Montenegro whose parliament met for the first time last week. Even if the union does not last long, it averted – at least for the time being – the potential regional instability that might have followed if Montenegro had gone ahead with the independence referendum that Djukanovic planned to hold in 2002.

Djindjic showed courage both in and out of office. In opposition he spearheaded the anti-Milosevic campaign in the difficult times of 1999. In government he took a calculated risk by transferring Milosevic to the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague in June 2001. He did so in the face of opposition from Serb political forces; from Yugoslavia's Constitutional Court; and from a still largely nationalist public. As on other occasions, Djindjic was acting out of a sense of supreme pragmatism. He was fully aware that without ensuring Milosevic's transfer, Serbia would be deprived of American financial aid.

Yet, whatever reforms he pursued, for much of the time he was in office Djindjic concentrated on winning his power struggle with Kostunica. On a number of occasions he used dubious means to further his objectives. In 2002 he masterminded the exclusion from parliament of many DSS deputies. Later on, after the DSS had been expelled from the governing coalition, its deputies were simply replaced by loyal DS and other allied supporters. Djindjic finally won this power struggle, with the union of Serbia and Montenegro. This left Kostunica without a job because the post of president was reserved for a Montenegrin.

If undisputed power was Djindjic's objective, he was barely able to enjoy the fruits of his success for more than a few weeks before his assassination.

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