What will life after war look like for Ukraine?

After three weeks of fighting, one of the many unusual aspects of Russia’s war in Ukraine is the near-daily juxtaposition of horror with hope. Even as Ukraine reported the bombing of the theatre in the besieged city of Mariupol, and the destruction of another block of flats outside the capital, Kyiv, high-level representatives from each side were claiming that the talks begun two weeks ago in Belarus were starting to bear fruit – and that the other side was now showing a more realistic attitude.

So much progress had apparently been made that a very specific 15-point peace plan was now said to be on the table, with its centrepiece a constitutional commitment by Ukraine to be a neutral state. The principle of neutrality having been conceded by Ukraine, among the points under discussion were now the terms of that neutrality. Would it take Sweden, or Austria, or Finland, perhaps, as a template? Would Ukraine retain its own armed forces? If so, what stated limits might there be on numbers, equipment and capability? What security guarantees might be given to Ukraine, and by whom?

Anything that entails Ukrainian neutrality has to be counted as a win for Russia. This has been Moscow’s central demand since long before it ditched diplomacy for military action. But neutrality does not now appear as much of a loss for Ukraine as it might once have done, especially not if the country retains its own armed forces.

This is because of the disillusionment – real or affected – that its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, expressed after his repeated pleas for the Nato alliance to protect his country with a no-fly zone were definitively turned down. His admission that Nato membership was effectively closed to Ukraine, and his unspoken question – what use is Nato support anyway, if it armed and trained Ukrainian soldiers only to stand on the sidelines when the real fighting began? – can be seen as an early turning point, and the juncture at which an end to the war first became possible.

So why, you might ask, has the fighting continued? Why was no ceasefire declared then? One answer might be that, for Russia, Ukraine’s neutrality was a pre-war aim; and that, having committed itself to military action, Russia is set on securing something more – something perhaps between Ukraine’s complete subjugation and more limited territorial gains, which could include strengthening the economy and security of Crimea and/or peeling off from Ukraine the erstwhile separatist regions of the Donbas.

Russia’s original objectives for the conflict, as set out by its president, Vladimir Putin, in the speech in which he declared war, were the “demilitarisation” and the “denazification” of Ukraine – which was interpreted as meaning regime change, even though Zelensky is Jewish and his government has not the slightest tinge of the far right, though some of the armed groups fighting for Ukraine have a less savoury character.

“Denazification” was reported to have been dropped as an objective early on in the talks, and regime change also seems no longer to be any sort of condition, given that the Zelensky government represents Ukraine at the talks. Further, “demilitarisation” also seems to have been watered down, if the discussions are about what sort of armed forces Ukraine might keep under the terms of a peace deal, and under what conditions it might be allowed to keep them.

Another explanation for the continued fighting might reflect Ukraine’s ambitions. While the Russian forces, it is mostly acknowledged, have generally been doing worse than expected, the Ukrainian forces have been doing much better. They know the terrain, their morale has remained high, and they have the benefit of a steady stream of western armaments, which Russia has so far seemed powerless to slow. Above all, they are fighting for their homeland. They may see no reason to abandon the fight now; by fending off the Russian advance, especially into cities, they are strengthening their position for the talks to come, which will be primarily about territory.

What Ukraine wants in territory is clear. Its maximal position is Ukraine as it was before the war, plus the reincorporation of the two separatist regions in the east and the return of Crimea to Ukraine. This is highly unlikely to happen. It might also be said that, in terms of national cohesion, Ukraine may be better off without these more Russia-facing regions. The best it can probably hope for is not to lose any of the territory it controlled before the war. Again, this is unlikely to happen, but how much territory Ukraine loses will be the gauge of how far Russia has won – in narrow battlefield definitions.

The minimum, which would almost count as a net loss and could have been achieved by military action far short of war, would be the “independence” of the separatist regions in the Donbas, to be subsequently incorporated into Russia or used as a bargaining chip for a federated Ukraine.

One step up, which could be the minimum Russia would realistically settle for in any peace agreement, would see Ukraine losing not just the separatist areas of the Donbas, but the two much bigger regions the Donbas is part of. Russia might angle for this territory to be recognised as a small country in its own right, which would result in Ukraine losing Mariupol (which already lies in ruins, but remains in Ukrainian hands) and the Northern Canal that supplies fresh water to Crimea.

Water has been a problem for Crimea since Russia annexed the peninsula in 2014, and this may be one reason for Putin’s determination to capture Mariupol. But there is at least one other: the city was occupied by Russia in 2014, before being lost to Ukrainian forces from the far-right Azov battalion. It is thought that Russia wants to avenge that loss. There are two much more ambitious options Russia might have had in mind. One would be the capture of the whole of the Black Sea coast, to leave Ukraine either landlocked in the long term or forced to barter for an outlet to the sea.

The westernmost port of Odesa has just been attacked for the first time (from the sea), but the difficulties Russia is still experiencing at Mariupol and at the next crucial city, Mykolaiv, suggest it may be hard for Russia to capture – let alone keep – the whole coast.

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The other would be the capture of the whole of Ukraine, including the capital, Kyiv. But if Russia ever entertained this idea – as its all-out invasion suggested it might – such a plan would seem now to be extinct, given the failure of Russian forces so far to take and occupy any city (with the possible exception of Kherson) and the reported scale of Russia’s losses.

All of which should leave a bitter taste for both sides – if and when the fighting gives way to talking. Russia may have neutralised Ukraine and consolidated its hold on Crimea, but this could have been achieved either without a war, or with a far smaller military operation confined to the east.

Similarly for Ukraine: the terms it is likely to settle for were on offer right through the autumn, but it took an actual war for the west to acknowledge that it was not prepared to risk WWIII for the sake of Ukraine, and for Ukraine to accept that reality, too. At the same time, Ukraine has already gained something from the war, which it may see as outweighing its losses.

That gain is a greatly enhanced sense of its own nationhood, which will only grow as the tales of heroic deeds take their place in the national mythology. In this sense, the war against Russia can perhaps be seen as a delayed war of independence, finalising the split that remained incomplete for 30 years after the Soviet Union’s collapse.