Friend or foe? The relationship between Turkey and Russia is a partnership of convenience

Relations between Turkey and France hit another low last week as a bitter political exchange exploded into the media, engendering provocative cartoons in magazines on both sides and further inflaming fundamental religious, cultural and civil boundaries.  

The two nations were squabbling over a number of issues, including maritime rights in the eastern Mediterranean, Libya and Syria – but a push from the French president, Emmanuel Macron, to protect France’s secular values against radical Islam quickly soured ties further.

It has been a while since Turkey dramatically shifted from a “zero problem” foreign policy to one of aggravation – with nationalism at its core.

This recent spat not only fits well within this policy, but it also serves for populist governments in both Ankara and Paris to consolidate their conservative support bases.

It comes at a time when Ankara’s ties with the European Union are stalled, bilateral issues disturb Turkey’s power in the region, and dialogue with the US is not likely to recover – regardless of the upcoming presidential election’s outcome. However, relations with Russia have so far looked more robust. 

But with Moscow also involved in the issues surrounding the Mediterranean, Libya and Syria, it might not stay that way for much longer.

The chemistry between the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, means it’s unlikely we’ll see bickering similar to that between Ankara and Paris, but the relationship stops short of anything more than a partnership of convenience.  

“Turkey has never qualified as our strategic ally,” Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said last month when asked at a press briefing to define the relationship between Turkey and Russia. “It is a partner, a very close partner. In many sectors, this partnership is of a strategic nature.”

The perception was shared by both sides, a Turkish government official confirmed to The Independent. Yet, the reminder came at a time when the two countries are locking diplomatic horns over the ongoing armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in relation to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.  

It was not the first time that Ankara and Moscow held opposite fronts in regional conflicts – such as in Syria, Libya or the eastern Mediterranean when they acknowledged each other’s weight, contributing to some partial resolutions, if not definite results.  

The recent escalation of fighting in the Caucasus, where both countries have serious stakes and strong historical ties, however, poses a greater challenge to the future of bilateral relations that only just recovered after a serious blow in 2015. Ties between the two nations froze then after Turkey downed a Russian jet along its border with Syria. Moscow banned charter flights to Turkey, ended visa-free travel and limited imports, all of which greatly impacted the Turkish economy.  

Rapprochement came a year later when Erdogan officially apologised – unaware that a coup attempt aimed at his religiously conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) government was brewing in the background.  

When the attack came in July, the west reacted with caution if not major delay, whereas Putin was the first leader to stand with Erdogan.  

“When Erdogan was traumatised after the coup, Putin established himself as his protector. When the Nato allies were almost upset that it didn’t succeed, Putin was there for him,” said Soner Cagaptay, author of Erdogan’s Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East.

“They have a close relationship, which doesn’t mean that Turkey and Russia are allies as there are clearly more differences than overlaps.”

Still, both have benefited handsomely from the overlaps: the TurkStream pipeline now brings Russian gas to southeastern Europe by largely bypassing Ukraine through Turkey; the two signed Turkey’s first nuclear power plant deal; there were bilateral investments valued at about $20m (£15.1m) in 2019, and Russians were one of the few nationalities to defy the pandemic this summer and support a crippled Turkish tourism sector.  

Further, Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 anti-missile systems pleased Moscow at the risk of Turkey aggravating Washington and opening the door for destabilisation of the Nato alliance. It also signalled a possible diversion from the pro-west path that Turkey has chosen in the post-Second World War order.  

However, the spring thaw might be short-lived, analysts say, if Ankara continues to push further into Russia’s Soviet heritage backyard either through its kin-based alliance with Azerbaijan or by persistently denouncing Russia’s annexation of Crimea after its military conflict with Ukraine in 2014.  

Ankara’s efforts to integrate Ukraine into Nato by organising joint military exercises, in addition to its advanced military equipment support, rubbed salt in Russia’s wound, says Kerim Has, a political analyst based in Moscow.  

“The Turkish government tires out, irritates Moscow with policies that are more aligned with interests of fringy nationalist circles than national interests. This might help Erdogan consolidate nationalist voters at home, but will not ease long-term Russia and Turkey relations,” Has says.  

“It is for a reason that think tanks close to the Kremlin now talk about ‘Erdogan wandering in Russia’s minefield’, which reads like a warning … To my eyes, it is just a matter of time before another major crisis hits bilateral relations.”

According to Aydin Sezgin, a former ambassador to Moscow and politician now in opposition with Turkey’s Iyi Party, the term “backyard” falls short of describing the importance of the Caucasus for Russia. “Moscow will never allow another referee or partner in that region.”

Ankara, on the other hand, has shown no intention up to now of alienating Azerbaijan, where it has invested heavily both militarily and financially, underlining the motto “two countries, one nation” in reference to the strong Turkic kinship.  

Instead, President Erdogan’s government raised its hand in giving Turkey’s historical support, reassuring Baku it would back the country “with all its resources and heart”.

Although such encouragements resonated among Turks who yearn for the country’s imperial past and ethnic dominance in the region, foreign policy requires a more delicate assessment of Turkey’s capacity versus its capability, argues Huseyin Bagci, a professor of international relations at Middle East Technical University.  

“Moscow still holds the power to traumatise Turkey,” Bagci says. “Whatever form the involvement, Turkey has to make clear that it has no intention of changing Russia’s historical position and role there, but rather, as two important players, they could contribute to future projects together creating ‘Benelux countries of south Caucasus’.”

Although it was unclear whether it was intense back-channelling or a well-calculated move to stun stakeholders, Putin last week changed his stance and invited all related parties, including Turkey, to the table for a diplomatic resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  

It meant that Russia, France and the US, as the co-chairs of the Minsk group – established in 1992 to negotiate a deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the future of Nagorno-Karabakh – no longer held exclusive roles in decision-making.  

A few weeks ago, the Azerbaijani ambassador to Turkey spoke confidently about the possibility of the two contributing to a final resolution in the 30-year long conflict.  

Speaking to press in an Ottoman building on the Bosporus Strait, the international waterway often frequented by Russian navy vessels, Hazar Ibrahim said: “Of course, there are areas of misunderstandings between Turkey and Russia. But wherever they can cooperate, it makes things better and this is what we need – we need stakeholders cooperating rather than competing with each other … When they come together, I think, that would be the best variable for regional security.”