Why Germany is right to be cautious over Ukraine

The unenviable position of Russian diplomats, ostracised across the western world and subject to walk-outs, paint-attacks and eggings, has been much remarked upon in recent weeks. But there is another group of diplomats who are having almost as hard a time, and with far less justification.

The foreign envoys of Germany are finding their country in the dock for what much of Europe and North America sees as the insufficient “esprit de corps” shown by their chancellor in providing military help for Ukraine.

Germany’s current diplomatic difficulties bring other western perceptions of its Ukraine policy full circle. Berlin caught a great deal of flak in what is now known to have been the run-up to the Russian invasion by offering only helmets rather than the weapons and ammunition other countries were pledging. “What’s next, pillows?” was just one of the sarcastic comments from Ukrainians at the time.

Within hours of Russian tanks crossing into Ukraine, however, criticism turned to praise. Chancellor Olaf Scholz turned Germany’s long-time policy of engagement with Russia on its head.

He told Moscow that there was no prospect of any gas flowing through the new Russia-Germany pipeline, Nordstream-2, and launched an urgent review of Germany’s energy policy, with a view to ending dependence on Russia. He announced that Germany was increasing its financial contribution to Nato to the prescribed 2 per cent of GDP ahead of the planned schedule, and that Berlin would start supplying actual weapons to Ukraine.

Cue cheers all around. Germany’s chancellor, in office only weeks, had reversed 16 years in which Angela Merkel had done her best to engage with Russia, and years of post-Cold-War Ostpolitik before then. Here was a principled chancellor who knew what he had to do, and did it. The western world congratulated itself on its unity in support of Ukraine and its determination to face down the Russia threat.

Now, with the war in its fourth month, Germany is almost back where it started: seen by other western governments and by Kyiv as a reluctant and half-hearted warrior at a time when solidarity and boldness must be the order of the day. He has declined to follow the procession of European leaders paying court to President Zelensky in person, and now seems hesitant once again – this time about supplying the heavy weapons Ukraine so badly wants.

Scholz’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, has talked a good talk, and she visited both Kyiv and the site of Russian atrocities in Bucha three weeks ago. She addressed the Bundestag earlier this week, accusing Russia of trying to “extinguish civilisation” in the Donbas, and calling for Germany to send Ukraine more artillery, drones and air defence weapons.

Scholz, for his part, had returned from the EU Council meeting in Brussels, reassuring his fellow leaders about Germany’s full support for Ukraine. To many, though, there was still a gap between his words and Germany’s deeds, and Scholz’s political will is once again in question.

That is the firm consensus, but it is time to ask how far this criticism is fair. Is Germany really not pulling its weight in terms of support for Ukraine, in the military or any other sphere? And even if it is, might that reflect a sober judgement on the part of the German government – a more sober judgement than is currently being exercised in some western capitals – that may stand it in good stead in times to come?

Germany’s actions have to be seen in the context of what has been happening on the ground in Ukraine – what is really happening, not what we wish were happening.

Assessments of the war so far can be seen in three stages: the first was a barely disguised view in the western world (and maybe in the Kremlin) that Russia would overrun Ukraine, the Kyiv government would flee, and the whole thing would be over within a week; the west might be in a position to help mop up, then negotiate some deal.

The second was surprised admiration for the Ukrainian president and his people’s resistance, feeding into a growing view in Washington, parts of Europe and at times Kyiv, that Ukraine could actually win – and achieve not only a return to the status quo before Russia invaded on 24 February, but the recovery of all the Donbas and Crimea to boot. This is when US officials started to hint at the removal of Vladimir Putin and the goal of weakening Russia – elevating what had been a defence of Ukraine into a proxy war against Russia.

And the third stage is just beginning: a dim recognition that Russia might be gaining the upper hand – and then what? That depends in part on Russia’s war aims – which could be to occupy or annex the whole of the Donbas, but could also be the thorough defeat of Ukraine. This is where the war stands now, and it presents not just Ukraine, but its western allies, with a dilemma.

The majority view is the logical extension of what has happened so far: Ukraine must be supplied with more weapons, heavier, longer-range and more accurate weapons, so that it can counter Russia’s current offensive. This assumes that the weapons will be in good hands, that they will enable Ukraine to turn the tide, and that a return to the status quo before 24 February will be back on the agenda as a possible settlement.

But what if that is not what happens, or – to put it more brutally – what if this assumption is not shared by all Ukraine’s allies? After some hesitation, President Biden has reportedly authorised the supply of the longer-range weapons Ukraine wanted, but it is not clear how soon, or how many, will arrive.

Boris Johnson, latterly a chief cheerleader for Zelensky, injected a new note of caution last weekend when he said that Russia was “making slow, but I’m afraid palpable progress”, even as he rejected any idea that Kyiv should talk to the “crocodile”.

And while EU leaders this week reached a compromise on new energy sanctions against Russia that kept up a semblance of unity, this was not the whole story. By no means all shared an enthusiasm for fast-tracking Ukraine (and Moldova and Georgia) into the EU.

And there were more than rumblings about the wisdom or otherwise of Ukraine fighting on, Italy’s Mario Draghi being one of the doubters. Macron and Scholz also had a joint telephone call with Putin – an attempt to keep channels open that was sharply condemned by the Latvian president, among others.

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Set in this context, however, Germany’s chancellor does not look either as weak or as isolated as he has often been presented. Germany also has its own interests to defend. Scholz has a coalition to keep together and a population to keep warm, safe and fed. It is easy to pillory Germany’s aversion to war.

And it is especially easy for those countries, such as the UK and the former Soviet-bloc countries, who say their hawkish instincts over Russia have been vindicated, to argue that scaling back arms supplies now and calling for talks would be to “appease” the bully. But what if the alternative is for Ukraine to lose even more territory than it lost in 2014? And what if the only way to prevent that is for Nato to take on Russia directly?

Far from being timid and wrong, Olaf Scholz may be rational and right – both in German national terms, and in European terms, too; one of the few looking honestly at the current balance of forces, realising that Ukraine may be harmed even more by fighting on – and preparing for the talks that must surely come.