Is the fire brigade to blame for Grenfell Tower deaths?

We were hoping they would save us because we trusted them,” said Grenfell survivor Paulos Tekle, whose five-year-old son Isaac perished in the blaze. He was talking about the firefighters who he says told his family to remain in their 18th-floor flat as flames engulfed the west London tower block. Several hours later, Isaac died after becoming separated from his parents as they tried to flee down the smoke-filled staircase.

Mr Tekle believes that, had he been told to leave his flat on the night of the fire, his son would still be alive. Anger over the “stay put” policy is shared by survivors and bereaved relatives, eight of whom spoke at a press conference following the publication of the first report from the public inquiry on Wednesday. They called on the London Fire Brigade (LFB) to “put their hands up and accept responsibility” for the fatalities, with some saying senior fire officers should face prosecution.

This focus on the firefighters’ response was also reflected in the inquiry report, which found that some of the 72 people who died in the fire may still be alive if the LFB had not stuck so rigidly to its “stay put” policy – based on the premise that highrise buildings can be expected to contain a fire in the apartment where it started, a principle known as “compartmentation” – and evacuated people instead.

One can fully appreciate why those directly affected by the tragedy are pinning the blame on the fire service, particularly in light of these findings. But, as London firefighters complain they have been scapegoated when issues with the tower’s structure and cladding are well-documented, it’s important to bear in mind that “stay put” is a policy in use across the country – and government ministers had been warned of its issues.

The policy was a topic of concern in the inquest into the Lakanal House fire in July 2009, in which six people died. The coroner wrote to government with a number of recommendations including new national guidance on this the policy. While ministers promised to review the guidance, this did not happen.

It is also important to bear in mind what was left out of the first stage of the inquiry. Phase 1 was focused only on the immediate response to the fire, making the London Fire Brigade, inevitably, the main focus – and leaving the causation, such as questions around the flammable cladding, largely unanswered.

The fact that the report nonetheless does highlight problems with the structure of the block and the non-compliance with building regulations – with report chair Sir Martin Moore-Bick saying it would be an “affront to common sense” not to address it – no doubt serves as an indication that the cladding will be of significance in the final conclusions of the overall inquiry.